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"HIGH COURT WRONGLY ELECTED": A
PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF JUDGING AND

ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT
RICHARD L. HASEN*

The debate over how judges should be selected and retained
has pitted judicial accountability, ostensibly promoted by judicial
elections, against judicial independence, ostensibly promoted by
judicial appointment. Using the tools of public choice theory,
Professor Richard Hasen argues in this article that judicial
accountabilityhas proven to be an elusive goal for most judicial
selection systems, and that judicial independence depends not so
much on the method of initialselection but rather upon the length
of judicialtenure-the longerthe tenure, the more independent the
judiciary. The article then applies the public choice model of
judging to consider two issues at the intersection of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) and the states' interest in choosing their judicial
selection mechanisms. First, states defending the practice of
electing judges from multimember districts against a claim of
minority vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA have argued
that judicial independence requires maintaining a "linkage"
between a judge's territorialjurisdiction and its electoral base.
These states claim that a move to single-member judicial
subdistricts would create the appearance and actuality of bias by
judges in favor of subdistrict voters. The public choice model
reveals that maintaininga system of multimember judicialdistricts
will not foster greaterjudicial independence because little reason
exists to believe judges selected from subdistricts will favor
subdistrict voters or that voters will believe judges will do so.
Second, the VRA appears to bar some states from moving to a
system of lifetime judicial appointments. Here, the public choice
model reveals that a system of lifetime judicial appointments
could foster greaterjudicialindependence, particularlyfor judges
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., 1986, University
of California, Berkeley. M.A., 1988, J.D., 1991, Ph.D. (Political Science), 1992, University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Anita Bernstein, Rafael Gely, Melinda Gann
Hall, J. Gerald Hebert, Pam Karlan, 3. Clark Kelso, Hal Krent, Dan Lowenstein, Richard
McAdams, Rick Pildes, Roy Schotland, Michael Solimine, and Joan Steinman. All errors
are mine alone.
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on the states' highest courts. Moreover, the position of minorities
appears no worse under an appointive system compared to a
judicial election system. Accordingly, Professor Hasen suggests
that Congress should amend the VRA, if necessary, so that courts
in appropriate circumstances may allow those states otherwise
barred by the VRA from doing so to move to a system of lifetime
judicialappointments.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent Chicago Sun-Times headline, "High Court Wrongly
Elected,"' suggested an insightful ambiguity. On one hand, it suggested there was something wrong with the process by which
members of the Illinois Supreme Court were elected. Vote fraud?
1. Tim Novak & Jon Schmid, High Court Wrongly Elected: Improper Districts
Could Bring Appeals, CHi. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 22, 1996, at 1.
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Illegal campaign contributions? (Certainly neither could be possible
in a state containing Chicago.) On the other hand, the headline suggested that electing judges was itself wrongful. Perhaps the article
would contend that judicial appointment or some other judicial selection mechanism was a better way to choose judges.
As it turned out, the story raised a procedural problem with the
election of justices for the Illinois Supreme Court, namely that the
Illinois legislature's failure to redraw electoral districts for judicial
elections violated the state constitution.2 But just a few weeks later, a
Chicago Tribune story made the second argument, that Illinois
should switch from judicial elections to appointment of judges under
the "Missouri plan."3
The debate over whether and how judges should be elected is
neither new4 nor confined to the state of Illinois.5 The debate pits
judicial accountability, ostensibly promoted by judicial elections,
against judicial independence, ostensibly promoted by judicial appointment. Using the tools of public choice theory, Part I of this
2. See id.; see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (requiring that the four Illinois Supreme
Court justices elected from outside Cook County be elected from districts of
"substantially equal population").
3. See Ken Armstrong, JudicialHopefuls Take Civic Liberties: Some Doctor Names,
Rdsumds to Try to Win, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at 1. Under the plan proposed by the
American Judicature Society, a seven member (nominally) non-partisan nominating
commission proposes a list of two to five nominees for judicial appointments. See Jona
Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 15, app. B. at 100 (1994). The governor chooses one of the nominees for a judicial appointment. See id. at 15. Then, appointed judges either run in an uncontested
retention election or are considered for retention by the nonpartisan commission. See id.
app. B at 105. See generally id. at 4-14 (discussing role of American Judicature Society in
promoting "merit selection"). Throughout this article I use the term "Missouri plan"
(where the system first was instituted) rather than the value-laden term "merit selection."
4. Many studies trace the evolution of judicial selection mechanisms in the United
States, from Alexander Hamilton's arguments in Federalist No. 78 favoring life tenure of
federal judges, to the shift to judicial elections in the Jacksonian era, to the rise of the
Missouri plan. Among the better historical surveys are MARY L. VOLCANSEK &
JACQUELINE LuCIENNE LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROss-EvOLUTION OF
FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 15-41, 75-98 (1988) and Kermit L. Hall, Progressive
Reform and the Decline of DemocraticAccountability: The PopularElection of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345; see also Steven P.
Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 689, 714-25 (1995) (tracing rise of elective judiciaries in the states); Joseph H.
Smith, An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104
(1976) (tracing history of independent judiciary in the American colonies). At last count,
39 states elected at least some of their judges. See SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE:
A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 6 (1990); see also id. at 141-45
(summarizing each state's judicial selection mechanisms).
5. See infra notes 28 and 91 (describing the variety of judicial selection mechanisms
used in the United States).
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Article argues that the debate has presented policymakers and the
public with a false choice. Judicial accountability has proven to be an
elusive goal for most judicial selection systems, and judicial independence depends not so much on the method of initial selection but
rather upon the length of judicial tenure; the longer the tenure, the
more independent the judiciary.
The issue of judicial selection mechanisms' has taken on new urgency since 1991, when the Supreme Court held that judicial elections
are subject to sections 2 and 58 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).9
Indeed, at least fifteen of the thirty-nine states holding judicial elections have faced VRA challenges." More litigation surely will follow
as minority plaintiffs challenge voting plans for judicial elections under section 2 of the VRA and as covered jurisdictions attempt to gain
preclearance for a change in voting procedures involving judicial
elections under section 5 of the VRA. Part II of this Article uses the
public choice model of judging developed in Part I to consider two
issues surrounding the tension between a state's interest in choosing
its judicial selection mechanism and the goals of the VRA in insuring
minority political representation. First, states defending the practice
of electing judges at-large or from multimember districts against a
claim of minority vote dilution under section 2 have argued that judicial independence requires maintaining the "linkage" between a
judge's territorial jurisdiction and its electoral base; these states claim
that a move to single-member judicial subdistricts would create the
appearance and actuality of bias by judges in favor of subdistrict voters. Second, states involved in section 2 litigation or subject to
section 5 preclearance may be barred from moving to a system of lifetime judicial appointments.
Regarding the first issue, the public choice model reveals that
maintaining a system of multimember judicial districts will not foster
6. For brevity's sake, I refer to "judicial selection mechanisms" rather than the more

accurate, but wordier, "judicial selection and retention mechanisms." In fact, the public
choice model reveals that the mechanism of judicial retention is more important than the
mechanism of initial judicial selection. See infra Part I.D.
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994). Following convention, I
refer to this statute in the text as "section 2."

8. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5,42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). Again following convention, I refer to this statute in the text as "section 5."

9. See Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 425-28 (1991); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,403-04 (1991); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646,652-60 (1991).
10. By August 1995, plaintiffs had brought section 2 challenges to judicial elections in
15 states. For a summary of these cases, see Anna M. Scruggs et al., Recent Voting Rights
Act Challenges to JudicialElections,79 JUDICATURE 34 (1995).
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greater judicial independence than a system of single-member subdistricts because little reason exists to believe judges elected from
subdistricts will favor subdistrict voters or that voters will believe
judges will do so. Accordingly, courts should not give credence to the
argument. Regarding the second issue, the public choice model reveals that a system of lifetime judicial appointments could foster
greater judicial independence, particularly for judges on the states'
highest courts. Moreover, the position of minorities appears no
worse under an appointive system compared to a judicial election system. Accordingly, Congress should amend the VRA, if necessary, so
that courts in appropriate circumstances may allow those states otherwise barred by the VRA from doing so to move to a system of
lifetime judicial appointments.
I. A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF JUDGING
A. Introduction: Judges as Self-Interested PoliticalActors
The intuition behind the age-old debate over judicial selection
mechanisms is that judges, like most people, act in their self-interest
much of the time. For example, an elected judge who desires reelection will not decide cases, at least not publicly, using the flip of a coin,
even though it would increase the judge's leisure time to do so; voters
expect judges to apply the law in a non-arbitrary manner, and a judge
who acts arbitrarily runs the risk of losing the next election. The idea
that judicial elections promote accountability flows from this fundamental assumption of judicial self-interest.
This Part develops a public choice model of judging, revealing a
more complex view of judicial motivation and a better understanding
of when and how judicial selection mechanisms matter. Public choice
theory uses that same intuition described above about self-interest in
the political arena, but applies it rigorously through the use of economic methodology."
Economic methodology assumes rational
utility maximization, that is, individuals in pursuit of self-interest
seek to maximize their expected utility.12 Just as economists posit
11. Public choice theory is "'the application of economics to political science.'
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE 7 (1991) (quoting
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989)). For a general introduction, see

Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of Campaign FinanceVouchers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-18 (1996).
12. See Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry:
The Effect of Framingon Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 394 (1990); see also id. passim (arguing that consumers often fail to act consistently with predictions of economic
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that business firms seek to maximize profits, public choice theorists
posit that political actors seek to maximize particular objectives; for
example, legislators seek to maximize votes.13
Public choice theory has two positive branches: social choice
theory, which evaluates various preference aggregation mechanisms,
and interest group theory, which focuses on incentives facing actors
in the political market.14 Though some public choice scholars have
examined the interaction of judges and social choice theory, and in
particular the coherence and stability of appellate court voting rules,"5
I am concerned here with the interaction of judges and interest group
theory: In other words, what do judges maximize and what does this
tell us about the relative merits of judicial selection systems?
Perhaps surprisingly, the literature on judicial utility maximization is poorly developed. Judge Posner has called the failure to
explain judicial behavior in economic terms "a mystery that is also an
embarrassment."'" He attempted to rectify the failure in What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else
Does).7 As the title of his article suggests, Posner argues that income and leisure are primary components in a judicial utility
function.'" Posner further assumes "that trying to change the world
plays no role in [the judge's utility] function."' Instead, judges gain
utility from the consumption value of voting.2'
Differing with Posner, other public choice theorists have followed the judicial behavior school of political science2' by assuming
theory).
13. See Hasen, supra note 11, at 10.
14. The theory also has a normative branch, which advocates political reform to promote overall social wealth regardless of its distribution, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See
id. at 8. The normative branch is irrelevant to the arguments in this Article.
15. Some of these scholars have focused on the application of Arrow's Theorem to
judicial decisionmaking. For a recent exchange on the subject among Professors John M.
Rogers, Maxwell Steams, David G. Post, and Steven C. Salop, see Colloquium, Appellate
Court Voting Rules, 49 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1996).
16. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does), 3 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
17. Id. Posner published a revised version of the article in chapter three of RICHARD
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 109 (1995).

18. See Posner, supra note 16, at 2,31-39 (setting forth model).
19. Id. at 3.
20. See id.; see also infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (discussing the con-

sumption model of voting).
21. For the leading work in political science, see

JEFFREY

A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.

SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 65 (1993) (stating that

the attitudinal model "holds that the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts
of the case vis-A-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices"); see also McNoll-

gast, Politicsand the Courts: A Positive Theory of JudicialDoctrine and the Rule of Law,
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"that judges are primarily motivated by a desire to impose their normative views, beliefs, and mores on the society in which they live."'
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 n.10 (1995) (noting that the public choice approach (what
the authors term "positive political theory") to judicial behavior "is related to attitudinist
perspective, which holds that Supreme Court Justices vote their 'attitudes,' a concept
close in spirit to the justice preferences in our model"). Political scientists have begun"to
question the broad applicability of the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking. For
example, Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace contend:
The attitudinal model as explicated in the U.S. Supreme Court is simplistic and
incomplete as a general explanation for appellate court decisionmaking because
of the unique configuration of institutional arrangements that give rise to the decisional patterns within the Court and because of the model's inattention to the
relative influence of preferences and case facts in alternative settings.
Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Justices' Responses to Case Facts: An Interactive
Model, 24 AM. POL. Q. 237,238 (1996).
22. Erin O'Hara, Social Constraintor Implicit Collusion: Toward a Game Theoretic
Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736, 738 (1993). O'Hara limits her
model to appellate judges, see id., but she does not differentiate between the goals of lifetenured appellate judges and appellate judges who must seek reelection or reappointment. O'Hara does suggest that life tenure avoids the unraveling or end-game problems
that may lead judges to avoid following precedent. See id. at 774-75.
Like O'Hara, other public choice analysts generally posit that judges act, at least in
significant part, to impose their views on society. See Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A
Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the
State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6:2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 267 (1990) ("We assume
... that the Court's preferences are essentially ideologically based."); Richard S. Higgins
& Paul H. Rubin, JudicialDiscretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 130 (1980) (arguing that
"district court judges maximize a utility function that includes as arguments 'judicial discretion' [Hand wealth"); Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the
Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 627, 631 (1994) (stating that lifetime tenure
"makes judges more likely to further their own self-interest by pursuing nonmonetary
interests such as increasing leisure (reduction in workload), discretionary power to select
which cases to consider, increased influence, and reputation within the legal community"); McNollgast, supra note 21, at 1646 (stating that a court acts "to maximize its own
preferences or ideology"); Eric Rasmusen, JudicialLegitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63, 67 (1994) (arguing a judge "wishes to create precedents in new
areas of law that will be obeyed by other judges"); Gordon Tullock, Public Decisions as
Public Goods, 79 J. POL. ECON. 913, 914 (1971) ("I would think that judges are, to a considerable extent, affected by their personal preferences .... "); see also Thomas J. Miceli
& Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decisionmaking,23 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 31, 38 (1994) (stating that a judge's utility function depends upon the judge's private
preferences over the outcome of a case and the reputation she establishes among her
peers). But see Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB.
CHOICE 107, 129 (1983) (positing that "self-interested judges seek prestige"); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & John R. Lott, Judicial Reputation and the Efficiency of the Common Law
passim (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (also positing prestige model).
Even Posner has expressed the view in his earlier writings that judges maximize imposition of their values on others. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 534 (4th ed. 1992) ("A possibility more consistent with the normal assumptions of
economic analysis is that judges seek to impose their personal preferences and values on
society."); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 887 (1975) [hereinafter Landes & Posner,
IndependentJudiciary] (stating that a judge decides a case a certain way "not because it
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This assumption, though recently challenged empirically,' seems a
sensible one to include in constructing a judicial utility function, at
least of life-tenured judges. Indeed, the assumption turns out to be
more plausible than Posner's consumption model of voting, for reasons explained in Part I.D below.
Posner and the other public choice theorists have focused explicitly or implicitly on federal appellate judges, who are appointed
for life.24 No public choice theorist has considered in any detail how a
judicial utility function would differ for judges attaining (and, more
will get him something else but because he derives personal satisfaction from preferring
one party to the lawsuit over the other or one policy over another"); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 249, 272 (1976) (stating that "the independent judge derives utility by imposing his
policy preferences on the community"); see also Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and
Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 982-84 (1995)
(contrasting Posner's earlier and later models of judicial behavior).
For an argument that public choice theory explains little about judicial behavior, see
Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 839 (describing the public choice theory of judging as "description, and rather bland description at that, without expose"); see also Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 1931, 1970-71 (1991)
(finding "unsatisfying" a public choice explanation for a Delaware Supreme Court judicial
decision in a major corporate law case).
23. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995). The authors explain that
a great deal of the political science literature has found "a pattern ... of Democratic
judges being more liberal than Republican judges." Id. at 261; see also id. at 260-61 nn. 69 (citing relevant literature). But they point out that that literature focuses almost exclusively on appellate judges, and they contend that for a number of reasons such a focus
may skew the results. See id. at 263-64. These authors instead analyzed a set of federal
civil rights cases filed in three federal districts, see id. at 265, and found no difference between the way Republican and Democratic judges decide such cases. See id. at 281. They
note, however, that
[their] initially surprising results can be reconciled with prior findings. In the
mass of cases that are filed, even civil rights and prisoner cases, the law-not the
judge--dominates the outcome[].... In the select few cases that are appealed or
lead to published opinions, individual judges have a greater role in shaping outcomes.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 4. Judge Posner qualified his focus on federal
appellate judges with the following caveat:
I have focused on the federal judiciary but the approach can and should be extended to elected judges, to Continental European judges, to jurors, and to
legislators. For example, my analysis predicts that judges elected for a term
work harder than appointed judges and also that they are less inclined to follow
precedent because they are more responsive to the current balance of political
power, hence less "independent."
Id. at 40-41; see also Cooter, supra note 22, at 128 ("The election of judges raises problems in mathematical politics which I cannot address in this paper."); O'Hara, supra note
22, at 738 (focusing on federal judges).
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important, retaining) office through different judicial selection
mechanisms.' I remedy that gap here, demonstrating that the incentives facing judges under different judicial selection systems should
lead to different case outcomes in a small subset of cases.
Following Posner, the best place to start in explaining what
judges maximize is to compare judges to other actors that economists
have studied successfully. Posner compared federal appellate judges
to the managers of a nonprofit enterprise, to voters, and to theatrical
spectators."s Though this may be a good starting place for discussing
life-tenured federal appellate judges, it is inadequate for modeling
other types of judges. Judges who run for reelection are best analogized to vote-maximizing politicians, particularly to those politicians
running for low-salience office. Judges who must stand for reappointment by a governor, legislature, or another appointing authority
are best analogized to bureaucrats who depend upon elected politicians for survival. Only judges who are elected or appointed for a life
term (or at least a long, indefinite term) fit the Posner model, with
some important adjustments explained below.
B. JudicialElections: Judges as Vote-Maximizing Politicians
Elected judges are in many ways indistinguishable from other
politicians. 7 In jurisdictions holding partisan judicial elections,
judges must gain the party's nomination, and often seek the local
party's endorsement.' In both partisan and non-partisan elections,
25. In an unpublished paper, Spiller and VandenBergh contrast judges elected in
competitive judicial elections to judges standing in retention elections, finding that the
latter have slightly more discretion in judicial decisionmaking. Pablo T. Spiller & Richard
G. VandenBergh, A Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making 20-22
(n.d.) (unpublished paper on file with the author). The authors assume that an elected
judge desires to be reelected and makes decisions to further that goal, see id at 8, and
they note that this goal differs from Spiller's assumption in an earlier paper that U.S. Supreme Court preferences reflect the ideology of the court, see id. at 11 n.34. The authors
do not discuss how this divergence in judicial goals could affect the outcome of judicial
decisions.
26. See Posner, supra note 16, at 3.
27. But cf Cass, supra note 22, at 969 n.95 (asserting that elected judges are "at most
a very small step" away from the prototype of federal appointed judges).
28. I have attempted to classify judicial selection mechanisms used by states into
categories here and infra note 91.
Nine states use partisan elections for choosing their highest ranking judges. See
COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1994-95, at 190-92 tbl.4.4 (1994)
[hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES]. These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee (except intermediate appellate judges),
Texas, and West Virginia. See id tbl.4.4. In addition, New York elects all of its judges,
except the judges serving on its highest court, through partisan elections. See id. at 191
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judges (or their surrogates0 ) often must solicit campaign contributions and run a campaign. Even judges standing for retention
elections sometimes must raise large sums to support retention." Although ethical canons restrict campaigning by judicial candidates in
some significant ways,31 judicial elections otherwise resemble contests
for elected office. Even judges running unopposed in retention elections must garner at least 50% of the vote; in Illinois retention
elections, judges must garner 60% of the vote.32
Given the similarities between judges and other elected officials,
analogizing elected judges to other politicians running for election
makes sense. Fortunately, public choice theorists have developed a
model of politicians, that of the vote maximizer. Although politicians, like all people, have a utility function consisting of a number of
elements, including maximization of income (or wealth) and leisure,
the public choice model posits that, unlike most people, politicians
are primarily "vote-maximizers" who wish to get elected and remain
tbl.4.4. Another thirteen states use (at least nominally) nonpartisan elections. See id. at
190-92 tbl.4.4. These states are: Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See
id. at 190-92 tbl.4.4. Note that some nominally partisan elections may have partisan undertones. See Croley, supra note 4, at 735-37 n.143 (author notes surprise when judicial
candidates at a county convention in Michigan were introduced by or mentioned their
party affiliations, despite Michigan's system of nonpartisan judicial elections.)
Like Kurt Scheuerman, I rely upon data provided in The Book of the States, but
Scheuerman used an earlier version of the book and classified some states differently than
I do. See Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking JudicialElections, 72 OR. L. REV.
459, 459-64 (1993). As Scheuerman notes: "Classifying judicial selection mechanisms
into distinct categories is difficult because many states utilize various combinations and
permutations of these systems." Id. at 459 n.2.
29. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a candidate from personally soliciting or accepting campaign contributions; the candidate must establish a committee to
handle all aspects of campaign finance. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5C(2) (1990).
30. Among the most expensive retention elections was the 1986 contest involving
Former Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court, and two of her supreme
court colleagues, Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin. For a discussion of this election, see
infranotes 62-64 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
32. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d) (imposing three-fifths retention requirement in
Illinois judicial retention elections); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty
Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 344 (1987)
[hereinafter Hall & Aspin, Judicial Retention Elections]. Looking at Illinois retention
elections, Aspin and Hall found that "judges who received far more than 60 percent 'yes'
votes in their last retention election were just as likely to campaign as judges who were
very close to the 60 percent threshold," and they concluded that it is "highly questionable
whether the threshold is at all responsible" for whether a judge in Illinois decides to actively campaign in retention elections. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Campaigning
for Retention in Illinois, 80 JUDICATURE 84, 85 (1996).
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in office.3 Election and reelection translates into utility gained by the
politician in terms of power, popularity, the ability to impose values,
or some combination of these benefits.'
Generally speaking, politicians attempt to maximize their votes
by selling access, influence, or positions on legislation to different
interest groups.3 5 Interest groups pay for access, influence, or positions on legislation by promising to deliver votes, directly or
indirectly, and by providing campaign contributions that allow politicians to advertise for additional votes. 6 Politicians will accept
campaign contributions and other assistance from interest groups until the marginal cost in votes of taking another contribution is equal
to the marginal benefit. One significant cost of accepting contributions is the cost of appearing corrupt: A politician may lose votes if
she is seen as selling influence or positions on legislation to interest
groups. 7
The vote-maximizing politician model, however, applies with
some important qualifications to politicians running in elections for a
low-visibility office like county coroner, which political scientists
term "low-salience" elections.38 Rational voters generally fail to invest in information about electoral candidates, and instead rely upon
free information acquired fortuitously while pursuing other activities.39 In low-salience races, voters are unlikely to acquire much free
information about any of the candidates. Faced with little or no information about candidates in these races, some voters simply fail to

33. For one of the earlier statements positing vote maximization, see ANTHONY
DoWNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 11 (1957) (assuming that "primary
goal" of government in democratic society is reelection).
34. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 22 ("A legislator who is not reelected
loses all the other possible benefits flowing from office.").
35. See Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Note, Modeling Campaign Contributions: The Market for Access and Its Implications for Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891, 1892-93 (1992). I
develop the arguments in this paragraph more fully in Hasen, supra note 11, at 10-12.
36. See MUELLER, supranote 11, at 464.
37. See Richard L. Hasen, An Enriched Economic Model of PoliticalPatronageand
Campaign Contributions: Reformulating Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1311, 1329 (1993).
38. For the classic study of low-salience elections, see Gary C. Byrne & J. Kristian
Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote for For County Coroner?,36 J. POL. 778 (1974).
39. See DoWNS, supra note 33, at 221-25, 245; see also Croley, supra note 4, at 731
("[V]oters have traditionally had very little incentive to gather information about judicial
candidates."); Harold W. Elder, Property Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An
Analysis of State Criminal Courts, 7 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 21, 22 (1987) (finding that
"voters have little incentive to invest in information gathering and will generally rely on
the low-cost information provided by the electoral process itself").
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vote in these races.4 Other voters rely upon voting cues, including
partisan affiliation, gender, ethnic surnames,' occupation,' and
even use of a nickname. 45 Still others vote for an incumbent (or vote
"yes" in a retention election) if they have a positive view of the political system generally, or vote against the incumbent (or vote "no"
in a retention election) if they have a negative view of the political
system generally. 46 In practice, most incumbents for low-salience of40. See Hall & Aspin, JudicialRetention Elections, supra note 32, at 346-47. ("The
average rolloff (i.e., the percentage of voters who cast ballots for the lead partisan office
on the ballot, but fail to vote in the judicial retention election) is 36.2 per cent for the
1,864 elections [studied].") Rolloff tends to be greatest in retention elections, less in nonpartisan competitive elections, and the least in partisan elections. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS,
FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 48 tbl.2 (1980).
Matsusaka has provided a plausible theory that could explain this rolloff: Voters
have a taste for informed voting, and they fail to vote when they feel they do not have
enough information to make an informed choice. See John G. Matsusaka, Explaining
Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information Theory, 84 PUB. CHOICE 91, 92-93 (1995). Examining the matter empirically, Griffin and Horan found a correlation between low levels
of information and increased levels of abstention. See Kenyon N. Griffin & Michael J.
Horan, Patterns of Voting Behavior in Judicial Retention Elections for Supreme Court
Justices in Wyoming, 67 JUDICATURE 68, 72 (1983); see also Nicholas P. Lovrich et al.,
Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28, 33 (1989)
(making similar findings).
41. See Anthony Champagne & Greg Thielemann, Awareness of Trial Court Judges,
74 JUDICATURE 271, 276 (1994) ("[L]acking other information, it appears that voters will
use party as an imperfect voting cue."). This cue sometimes has validity. See Lawrence
Baum, Voters' Information in JudicialElections: The 1986 Contests for the Ohio Supreme
Court,77 KY. L. J. 645, 650 (1989); Hall & Brace, supra note 21, at 253 ("Democrats are
significantly less likely than Republicans to uphold death sentences."). But in effectively
one-party states, the cue is useless in choosing a judicial candidate. See Champagne &
Thielemann, supra,at 278.
42. In California, male candidates had an 8% advantage over female candidates. See
Byrne & Pueschel, supra note 38, at 783.
43. Candidates with a Scandinavian surname had a 24% advantage over candidates
with other ethnic names. See id. at 782. In contrast, candidates with an Italian surname
had a 39% disadvantage over candidates with other ethnic names. See id.
44. See id. at 781. The authors found that a candidate leaving blank the occupational
designation section on the ballot is at a 39% disadvantage. Occupations increasing the
expected vote were: professor (74% increase), incumbent (47% increase), engineer (21%
increase), and lawyer (16% increase). Occupations decreasing the expected vote were:
stockbroker (13% loss), doctor, dentist, life insurance salesman (14% loss each), housewife (20% loss), salesman (22% loss), and real estate broker (24% loss). See Id. at 78182. Along similar lines, Dubois found that labeling oneself with a "judicial label" (like
"superior court judge" or "incumbent") is a decided electoral advantage. See Philip L.
Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18
L. & Soc'Y 1Ev. 395,404-05,420-22 (1984).
45. Candidates who use a nickname have a 79% advantage over those who do not.
See Byrne & Pueschel, supra note 38, at 783. Nicknames "included any name in quotes or
brackets or any name not a derivative of a proper name." See id. at783 n.3.
46. See Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, PoliticalTrust and JudicialRetention Elec-
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fices are reelected.'
Given this environment, the strategy of a vote-maximizing politician running for a low-salience office depends upon whether she is
an incumbent or a challenger. To the extent that a majority of voters
has a positive view of the political system, the rational strategy for an
incumbent is simply to lay low. Absent a strong challenger, the incumbent stands to gain little by raising a large amount of campaign
contributions and running a high-visibility campaign. Challengers, on
the other hand, have a strong incentive to raise campaign contributions, first to raise the profile of the electoral race (that is, to make
the judicial election high-salience), and then to convince the voters
that the challenger is the preferred candidate.48 Given the importance of voting cues in these races, rational vote-maximizing
incumbents and challengers have incentives in appropriate cases to
gain a party nomination, 9 switch parties," change their names, 1 or list
a "good" occupation on the ballot. 2
tions, 9 L.& POL'Y 451, 461 (1987) ("[P]olitical trust and the mean affirmative vote in
retention elections are positively related in the period from 1964 to 1984.").
47. In judicial retention elections, which are among the lowest salience elections, see
infranotes 53-54, nearly 99% of judges seeking retention have been retained. See Robert
C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316,
318 (1994) (citing Hall & Aspin, JudicialRetention Elections, supra note 32). Hall and
Aspin calculated the mean percentage affirmative vote in retention elections at 77.2%.
See Hall & Aspin, JudicialRetention Elections, supranote 32, at 343.
48. Alternatively, challengers may choose to run in low-salience elections when an
incumbent has resigned or retired.
49. Until recently, the Cook County, Illinois Democratic Party apparently charged
assessments of up to $8,500 per judicial candidate (even if the judge was running unopposed) for a party endorsement. See Marlene Arnold Nicholson & Norman Nicholson,
FundingJudicialCampaigns in Illinois, 77 JUDICATURE 294, 298-99 (1994). Illinois law
now prohibits this practice. See id. at 299.
50. See Champagne & Thielemann, supra note 41, at 276 (noting party-switching of
Democratic judges to the Republican party following Republican party victories).
51. People do change their names to run for office. Consider this account from the
Chicago Tribune:
In Cook County, where voters often know little about the dozens of judicial
candidates, some candidates have adopted Irish names.
And in 1994, two years after voters seemed inclined to prefer female candidates, Arthur Janura ran as A. Laurin Janura and Gregory Rusniak as G.
Carmen Rusniak.
This year, one candidate has listed his name as Gerald "COP" Zansitis. It's
not trickery, he said. He is a part-time Homewood police officer.
Armstrong, supra note 3, at 1; see also DUBOIS, supra note 40, at 83-89 (recounting numerous cases of voter misidentification of judicial candidates with similar names).
52. See Joseph R. Cerrell, Running for Judge: How Non-partisan?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECS., May 1996, at 34, 35 ("[A] sitting Superior Court judge listed herself as
'incumbent' on the ballot. She lost a close contest. Experts agreed that she could have
won if she had listed herself as 'judge.' ").
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This analysis applies to most judicial races, which tend to be lowsalience. 3 Retention elections are especially low-salience because no
competitor exists who has an incentive to raise the profile of the election.' Even in judicial elections with two or more competitors, ethics
rules make it difficult for a judicial challenger to raise the profile of
an election by arguing that a particular case was wrongly decided, or
by promising to decide future cases a particular way. The only kinds
of promises that may be made by judicial candidates are promises to
act with honesty and integrity.55
53. See DUBOIS, supra note 40, at 244 ("Judicial elections are admittedly... lowsalience electoral events."). The data on lack of voter information about judicial elections
are overwhelming. A recent report by the American Judicature Association summarized
the findings of the social science studies on the subject:
*
Only 14.2% of Lubbock, Texas, voters in a 1979 general election could
identify a single judicial candidate on the ballot immediately after voting.
*
Less than one-fifth of responding voters registered in Washington and Oregon felt they had adequate information to vote in the 1982 primary elections:
35.2% reported that they had no information at all about judicial candidates and
another 44.3% felt they had inadequate information to reach an informed decision.
*
In 1980 Wyoming Supreme Court retention elections, 23.8% of the voters
surveyed did not know why they voted for or against a candidate, 9.7% saw no
reason not to vote as they did, and 13.65% of those who voted for retention simply had not heard anything bad about the judge.
*
In a nationwide survey, few registered voters could correctly answer a questionnaire about the roles of different levels of judges, the differences between
civil and criminal courts, and the relationship between the state and federal judiciaries.
MATHIAS, supra note 4, at 17 (footnotes omitted). Distributing a voter pamphlet describing judicial candidates appears to be one of the best ways to increase voter
knowledge. See Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters in Contested, NonpartisanJudicialElections: A Responsibile [sic] Electorate or a Problematic Public,36 W.
POL. Q. 241,253 (1983). See generally Nicholas P. Lovrich & Charles H. Sheldon, Voters
in JudicialElections: An Attentive Public or An Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. SYS. J.
23, 23-39 (1984) (making similar findings).
54. Indeed, retention elections were intended to be low-salience. See Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64
JUDICATURE 210, 233 (1980) (observing that retention elections "were designed to allow
qualified judges to serve long terms with only a modest amount of direct accountability.
Indeed, those who developed the concept preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced to
political realities and allowed the public an opportunity to remove judges in extreme circumstances.").
55. For a summary of the restrictions on judicial candidates, see PATRICK M.
MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE:

THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION

CAMPAIGNS (1990). Since the publication of this book, the American Bar Association
has amended its Model Code of Judicial Conduct to allow for greater discussion of political issues byjudges. See MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (1990).
However, the Code still prohibits a judge or judicial candidate from making "pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office" or from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the

1997]

HIGH COURT WRONGLY ELECTED

1319

An incumbent judge who expects a low-salience race need not
worry about public opinion in deciding most cases; she can safely
"vote her values" most of the time. 6 Only occasionally will a judge
face an issue of substantial public importance that has the potential
to transform the judicial race from low-salience to high-salience. A
rational strategy for an elected judge facing such a case is to postpone
deciding the case until after an election, or to duck a difficult issue by
using a procedural tool to avoid decision.' On that rare occasion
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court." Id.
56. See Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis of Choice of Law,
24 GA. L. REv. 49, 72 (1989) (arguing that given low voter awareness and turnout for
judicial elections, "we should not expect judge-made tort law, or choice of law, to be
much driven by interest group pressures"). I discuss later in this section empirical evidence supporting my claim. At this point, however, I should note two possible objections
to the idea that judges do not "vote their values" much of the time. First, judges tend to
respect precedent. Respect for precedent itself, however, could be a value of the judge,
something the judge places ahead of ideological preferences. In addition, O'Hara has
noted a number of strategic reasons why judges who wish to impose their values on society may rationally choose to follow precedent. See O'Hara, supra note 22, passim
(explaining judges' decisions whether to respect precedent as a prisoners' dilemma tournament). Second, a judge may be reluctant to vote her values in a case involving the
construction of a statute because the legislature could overrule the judge. See Gely &
Spiller, supra note 22, passim; Spiller & VandenBergh, supra note 25, passim. These arguments, however, merely point out that a judge votes her values within institutional
constraints. For the same reason, a judge will not impose the death penalty against a defendant who committed a crime not subject in that jurisdiction to the death penalty, even
if the judge believes the defendant deserves the penalty for that crime. More importantly,
institutional constraints, like respect for precedent, exist across judicial selection mechanisms; therefore, the extent to which these factors influence the ability of judges to vote
their values is independent of whether judges are elected or appointed, as well as independent of the length of the judicial term.
57. Sometimes a judge will miscalculate the importance of a particular case or the
preferences of a majority of voters. The case of California Superior Court Judge Joyce A.
Karlin is an example. Karlin imposed a voluntary manslaughter sentence of five years
probation on a Korean grocer who fatally shot an African-American teenage girl. Some
irate voters organized a campaign to defeat Karlin, but despite the voters' success in creating a high-salience race, the judge was still reelected. See Croley, supra note 4, at 73940. Croley points to the case as an illustration of "the political pressures to which lower
court judges are sometimes subjected," but he admits that "[e]lectoral pressures and the
judicial reactions they precipitate may be virtually impossible to capture empirically." Id.
at 740. I do not deny that there are instances in which trial court judges decide cases in
response to real or perceived electoral pressure, but, contrary to Croley, there is no reason to believe this is more than the extremely rare case.
Judges being considered for appointment to a higher judicial office also have an incentive to delay issuing controversial decisions. Newspaper articles suggested that then
appellate court judge and now Justice Clarence Thomas delayed issuing a controversial
decision on the constitutionality of FCC gender preferences until after Thomas's Senate
confirmation hearings for his current post on the Supreme Court. See Garry Sturgess,
Senate Mulls Thomas' ControversialCase; Draft Opinion Would Overturn FCCRuling on
GenderPreferences,LEGAL TIMES, Sep. 30, 1991, at 1.
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where an elected judge must decide such a case on the merits, the
judge is likely to follow the preference of the majority of voters, to
the extent that majority preferences are known to the judge. As the
late California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus remarked,
"ignoring the political consequences of visible decisions is 'like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.' ,5sMoreover, elected judges
have an incentive to avoid deciding a low-salience case in a way that
makes the case high-salience. 9
High-salience judicial elections are most likely to occur in elections for positions on the highest court in a jurisdiction, though very
few high-salience elections occur even at this level of the judiciary. °
Generally speaking, judges sitting on the highest court in a jurisdiction make the most visible and important decisions, in part because
their decisions bind everyone in the entire jurisdiction. Another reason elections to the highest state courts are more likely to become
high-salience than elections to lower courts is that high courts routinely make decisions affecting the wealth of organized groups with
relatively few members, such as insurance companies and the plaintiffs' bar. These small organized groups can overcome collective
58. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1583
(1990) (quoting Paul Reidinger, The Politicsof Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58);
see also Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1995, 2004 (1988) (Oregon Supreme Court Justice, authoring the article and quoting, "if you cannot cope with the crocodile, get out of the bathtub"); Robert S. Thompson,
Judicial Retention Elections and JudicialMethod- A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S.CAL. L. REv. 2007, 2057 (1988) ("There are judges willing
to be a crocodile meal for the sake of principle, and Justice Kaus has always given the
strongest of indications of being one of them.").
59. Cf. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL AcriON 267-68
(1990) (arguing an analogous point with regard to Congressional action and stating that
legislators "are especially responsive to inattentive publics when they are asked to decide
about an issue for which the group costs could become visible and traceable if Congress
enacted the wrong policy").
60. Although Croley suggests that judicial elections may be increasing in salience, see
Croley, supra note 4, at 735, empirical evidence suggests that low-salience remains the
norm for judicial elections, including elections to state high courts. In a nationwide survey of retention elections from 1980 to 1990, 100% of intermediate appellate court judges
and 98.2% of state supreme court justices were retained in office. See Luskin et al., supra
note 47, at 319-20. Champagne and Thielemann, examining a recent Texas election,
found that "[o]nly one judge, embroiled in a controversy that received national publicity,
had office recognition from over one-quarter of registered voters. Some judges, even a
state supreme court justice, had almost no office recognition." Champagne & Thielemann, supra note 41, at 276. When a judge loses a retention election, it is still major
news. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 53-54
(commenting on defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny J. White in retention
election); Sending Judges A Message, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1996, at A12 (commenting on
defeat of Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier in retention election).
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action problems and raise campaign contributions to increase the salience and influence the outcome of high court judicial elections. 1
For example, in 1986 retention elections in California, business and
insurance interests made large campaign contributions to oust Chief
Justice Rose Bird, who was known for her pro-consumer and protenant decisions. 2 Significantly, the groups used advertisements not
to point out Bird's anti-business decisions, but rather to point out her
opposition to the death penalty, a punishment supported by a majority of Californians." In a parallel manner, campaign contributions
supporting Bird and her allies on the court did not come primarily
from death penalty opponents, but from plaintiffs' lawyers working
on contingent fees, "the interest of whose clients had been advanced
by the tort decisions of the court and whose financial interest had
been advanced accordingly.""
Nothing better illustrates the idea that groups with much at stake
in high state courts' decisions attempt to influence the outcome of
judicial elections than the 1986 race for the Texas Supreme Court. In
that race, lawyers for both sides in the multi-billion dollar TexasPennzoil dispute contributed heavily to campaigns for competing
candidates for the Texas Supreme Court elections before the court
ruled upon whether to hear an appeal of their dispute. 6 Throughout
the United States, "[c]ontributions by lawyers and law firms repre61. For a summary of some of the more controversial campaign contributions in judicial elections, see MATHIAS, supra note 4, at 47.
62. See Erwin Chemerinsky, EvaluatingJudicialCandidates,61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985,
1986 (1988) ("The media campaign against the justices received heavy contributions from
big business interests that were angry with the court's decisions protecting consumers',
tenants', and employees' rights.").
63. See id. at 1987 ("The California election was not the occasion for serious public
discussions about legal doctrines or the proper role of the court.... Instead, the issues
were trivialized so that the failure of the court to carry out the execution of convicted
murderers was taken as irrebuttable evidence of judicial incompetence."); see also Gerald
F. Uelmen, Commentary: Are We Reprisinga Finaleor an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
2069, 2070 (1988) ("The [1986 California retention] election reflected frustration on one
issue-the death penalty."). That is not to say that the death penalty was the only issue
any voter considered. See J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims' Bill of Rights:
Where Did It Come From and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. L.J. 843, 858 (1992)
(describing a series of non-capital criminal cases decided by the court as having "the effect of damaging the credibility of the Supreme Court of California in criminal matters, at
least in the eyes of a large segment of California's population").
64. Thompson, supra note 58, at 2038 (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers and their organizations contributed a total of $735,000 to the campaigns of the three justices).
65. See Gerald Uelmen, Disqualificationof Judgesfor Campaign Support or Opposition, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 419, 422 (1990) ("In the 1986 Texas Supreme Court races,
lawyers for Pennzoil contributed $315,000 to five justices, while lawyers for Texaco contributed $72,700 to the same five justices.").
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sent the largest share of contributions to judicial campaign coffers."66
Empirical evidence demonstrates that elected judges tend to
follow majority voter preferences in deciding high-salience cases.
Professor Melinda Hall found that judges sitting on the highest state
courts and subject to reelection tend to decide at least one class of
visible and important cases-death penalty cases-consistent with
majority voter preference favoring the punishment, even when the
individual judges oppose the death penalty for ideological reasons.67
Hall's study of decisionmaking on the Louisiana Supreme Court contains evidence that at least one justice voted to uphold the death
penalty in some cases because of fear of losing the next election despite ideological opposition to the penalty." In another study of the
supreme courts in four conservative states holding judicial elections,
Hall found that "district-based elections, close margins of victory,
approaching the end of a term, and certain types of electoral experiences increase the probability that justices will uphold death
'
sentences initially imposed by trial courts."69
Paul Brace and his co-authors uncovered similar voting patterns
66. id.at 421; see also Philip L. Dubois, Financing Trial Court Elections: Who Contributes to CaliforniaJudicial Campaigns?, 70 JUDICATURE 8, 12 (1986) (finding that
lawyers contributed 39.2% of the primary dollars and 32.4% of the available runoff funds
to judicial candidates for California superior court judgeships in the 1980 race); Nicholson
& Nicholson, supra note 49, at 297 (noting that attorneys were the largest single source of
funds for Illinois judicial campaigns). Putting aside free-rider problems, it certainly appears rational for lawyers to contribute to judicial campaigns. First, lawyers on average
have the most knowledge about judges. If a taste for informed voting exists, see supra
note 40, a taste for informed contributing probably exists as well. Because lawyers are
the most informed about judges, they would be most likely to make contributions. More
importantly, lawyers "tend to view [campaign] contributions [to judges] as a form of insurance. They can't afford not to be contributors." Gerald F. Uelmen, Essay, Supreme
Court Retention Elections in California,28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 352 (1988). Uelmen's argument echoes Fred McChesney's observation that legislators can often extract
payments from interest groups in exchange for not taking away the groups' ability to capture rents from the state. See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in
the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 . LEGAL STUD. 101, 102-03 (1987).
67. See Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117,1120-21 (1987).
6& See id. However, Hall's study found that two other "liberal" judges dissented as
often in death penalty cases as they did generally in all criminal cases. See id. at 1121.
69. Melinda Gann Hall, Justicesas Representatives: Elections and JudicialPolitics in
the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 497-98 (1995) [hereinafter Hall, Justices]; see
also Melinda Gann Hall, ElectoralPoliticsand Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,
54 J. POL. 427, 438-39 (1992) (making similar findings). Elected judges also may be very
reluctant to act against the voters' will concerning ballot measures. See Eule, supra note
58, at 1581. However, recent court decisions like the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996), striking down
an anti-gay rights initiative, suggest otherwise.
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when state supreme court judges dealt with another high-salience issue, abortion. 70 They found that judges with life tenure were
significantly more likely to overturn state abortion statutes than
elected judges, at least when the governor and a majority of the state
legislature were from the same political party.71 In addition, judges
chosen in competitive elections were significantly less likely to overturn abortion statutes than judges facing retention elections72
probably because in competitive elections a challenger might use the
judge's abortion decision to raise the judicial campaign into a highsalience one.
Unfortunately, I am aware of no empirical studies examining
whether elected judges tend to follow majority voter preferences in
low-salience cases as well. I would expect a study of such cases, such
as a study of routine commercial disputes, to show no statistically significant difference between how elected judges and life-tenured
judges decide such cases or between how judges elected in competitive elections and those standing for retention elections decide such
cases. Because such studies do not exist, I cannot entirely discount
the possibility that some judges may misperceive the salience of many
low-salience cases, and then follow majority preferences in these
cases as well.
This evidence presents a far more complex picture of an elected
judge's decisionmaking criteria than the model of the "accountable"
elected judge usually presented in literature arguing for judicial elections. According to Philip L. Dubois, a staunch defender of partisan
judicial elections, judges are accountable when four conditions are
met: First, the electorate must be able to pass judgment upon the
performance of elected officials at regular and periodic intervals.
Second, the electorate must be provided with the opportunity to express a choice between opposing candidates; in expressing
dissatisfaction with the performance of an incumbent, an alternative
choice must be available. Third, the voters must be able to identify
officials with the policies they have made and, concurrently, to know
in a general way what kinds of policies the challenger can be expected to promote once in office. Finally, those who win public office
by election must behave "in accordance with their pre-election atti70. See Paul Brace et al., Judicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions,
Context and the Autonomy of Courts 11-14 (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at
the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29September 1, 1996) (on file with author).
71. See id. at 13.

72. See id.

1324

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

tudes .... Ifvoters prefer the more conservative candidate but if,
once elected, he behaves as his more liberal opponent would have,
the electorate has been deceived in its efforts to exercise control of
policies. '
Despite Dubois' claims to the contrary, 74 empirical evidence
mostly confirms that in low-salience judicial races-which form the
overwhelming majority of judicial races-the third criterion of judicial accountability is not met. Specifically, voters cannot identify
judges with the policies they make or the alternative policies of challengers (in those states without retention elections).' Dubois limits
his claim of accountability to partisan judicial elections, arguing that
the partisan cue substitutes for specific knowledge of judicial policies. 6 But the evidence strongly suggests that the partisan
identification of a judge often is a poor indicator of a judge's voting
record.' And even Dubois does not argue that nonpartisan or retention elections meet his requirements for judicial accountability.
Whether judicial accountability exists in the rarer high-salience
judicial races is a more complicated question. When a judicial race
has become high-salience because of the public's focus on a particular
issue or set of issues, such as the death penalty, judges appear to be
subject to majoritarian pressures and therefore to meet Dubois' four
accountability requirements.7" Though it may be "unseemly" for a
73. DUBOIS, supra note 40, at 32 (quoting John L. Sullivan & Robert E. O'Connor,
ElectoralChoice and PopularControlof PublicPolicy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1256, 1257 (1972)).
74. See Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of PopularJudicialElections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 41-42 (Special Issue, May
1986) (arguing that partisan elections ensure judicial accountability).
75. See supra note 53 (summarizing social science literature describing lack of voter
knowledge about judicial candidates).
76. See Dubois, supra note 74, at 41-42.
77. See supra note 23 (stating that party identification of federal district court judges
is a poor predictor of votes in civil rights cases); see also Champagne & Thielemann, supra
note 41, at 278 (noting that in effectively one-party states, party identification is useless to
determine a judge's ideological position); id. at 276 (finding that judges in some states
engage in party-switching).
78. The extent to which judges decide death penalty cases in line with majority sentiments may raise constitutional concerns. See Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 397
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that elected judges may feel pressures to uphold a
jury's recommendation to impose the death penalty, and this pressure is impermissible in
determining whether the penalty should be imposed). For a more general argument that
judicial elections inherently lead to unconstitutional results, see Scott D. Wiener, Note,
PopularJustice: State JudicialElections and ProceduralDue Process,31 HARV.C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 187, 202-16 (1996). See also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498
n.164 (1986) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause should today be con-
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judge to decide a high-profile case in a manner inconsistent with her
values but consistent with majoritarian pressures,79 that is precisely
the incentive created by the popular reelection of judges.
However, when a judicial race becomes high-salience because of
the campaign contributions of small, organized groups, accountability
may not be achieved. Suppose in the California case that a majority
of voters disagreed with Justice Bird's position on the death penalty
but agreed with her pro-consumer, pro-tenant decisions. Does a
majority vote against Bird in a race that focused only on the death
penalty issue and not on the other issues signify an accountable judiciary or one subject to the influence of small groups? In highsalience, well-funded judicial races, will judges vote their values, be
subject to majority pressure, or feel compelled to vote consistently
with the preferences of their largest campaign contributors? In such
cases, Dubois' fourth accountability criterion may not be met because
judges may not behave in accordance with their pre-election promises
to behave impartially.'
strued to incorporate by reference [to state judges] the standards of judicial independence
imposed by Article III upon the federal judiciary."); Wiener, supra, at 202-03 ("Since due
process requires a neutral adjudicator and an individualized, participatory adjudication,
and since judicial elections create a substantial risk that these requirements will not be
met, elected judiciaries do not pass constitutional muster."). For an argument that
elected judiciaries threaten commitments to constitutionalism and the rule of law, see
Croley, supra note 4, at 788.
79. See Croley, supra note 4, at 696 n.22 (exploring the intuition that judicial elections
are "unseemly").
80. Moreover, if judicial election outcomes in high-salience elections are determined
(or at least influenced) by campaign contributions of the wealthy or of lawyers appearing
before their judge-contributees, the problem of unequal access to justice arises as well.
Whether campaign contributions to elected officials generally should be barred or limited
on egalitarian grounds is a topic beyond the scope of this article. For a recent argument
in favor of the idea, see Hasen, supra note 11, at 14-18. For a recent argument against
this idea, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1077-81 (1996). But the ability of individuals or groups to influence judicial elections with campaign contributions remains
especially problematic. Although some normative political theorists accept the idea that
legislative outcomes may be influenced by campaign contributions, virtually no one thinks
judicial outcomes should be so influenced: Instead, the professed norm is equal justice
under law. In fact, a substantial body of scholarship explores judicial conflicts-of-interest
stemming from campaign contributions. See, e.g., Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an
Independent Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 839 (1994); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign
Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2
J.L. & POL. 57 (1985); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases
Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988); Bradley A. Siciliano,
Note, Attorney Contributionsin JudicialCampaigns: Creatingthe Appearance of Impropriety, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217 (1991). For a look at the recent phenomenon of political
action committee involvement in judicial campaigns, see Anthony Champagne & Kyle
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In sum, the public choice model of judging reveals that elected
judges will be accountable only in rare circumstances.8 In lowsalience races, which comprise an overwhelming majority of judicial
elections, voters receive no reliable cues to inform their choices
about judicial candidates, and judicial incumbents rarely have incentives to supply such information. Therefore, these judges may vote
their values, that is, act independently, most of the time. In some
high-salience races, judges are accountable to the extent that their
most visible decisions will tend to reflect majority preferences. In
other high-salience races, judicial decisions may reflect the interests
of campaign contributors rather than the interests of a majority of
voters.
C. JudicialReappointments: Judges as Bureaucrats
Judges who need not stand for reelection differ from the votemaximizing judges described above in their strategies for political
survival, but not in their goals. Specifically, judges standing for reappointment still maximize some utility function containing an income
(or wealth) and leisure component, along with a desire for prestige,
popularity, power, or some combination of these attributes. But
rather than achieving these goals by maximizing votes, judges who
stand for reappointment achieve these goals by maximizing their
chances for reappointment.
Reappointment-maximizing judges look very much like bureaucrats, particularly political appointees," who depend upon elected
politicians for survival. William Niskanen first developed a public
choice model of the bureaucracy, arguing that bureaucrats seek to
maximize the size of their agency's budgets." Niskanen's theory posited that "[s]enior bureaucrats maximized budgets because the
opportunities for promotion and higher salaries, as well as for greater
prestige and power, depended on the size and growth of their agencies. Bureaucrats were able to accomplish their objective because
Cheek, PACs and JudicialPolitics in Texas, 80 JUDICATURE 26 (1996) and Traciel V.
Reid, PAC Participationin North CarolinaSupreme Court Elections, 80 JUDICATURE 21
(1996).
81. For a non-economic argument reaching the same conclusions, see Scheuerman,
supra note 28, at 476-82.
82. I mean here to contrast "political appointees" with "senior career civil servants,"
who are not reappointed vth each new administration and who have various civil service

protections. See

RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL
SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 160 (1994) (discussing the two

types of bureaucrats).
83. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 114 (1971).
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they controlled the information used by the Congress in deciding
agency appropriations."' Niskanen's model, when applied to judges,
suggests that judges would decide cases in ways that expand the need
for additional court resources, such as by creating new causes of action, expanding existing causes of action, or creating uncertainties in
the law.
Further research on bureaucracy, however, has shown
Niskanen's model to be empirically questionable and inadequate to
explain all bureaucratic behavior." Contrary to Niskanen's model,
bureaucrats' preferences drive some policy outcomes. Johnson and
Libecap note that bureaucrats "often administer policies regarding
the environment, health care, and defense, and people hold intense
preferences about what the government's role in these areas should
be." ' 7 Bureaucrats act consistently with their preferences to the extent they have autonomy from the authorities who control the
bureaucrats' continued employment. The amount of autonomy that
a bureaucrat-agent has from her politician-principals depends upon
the number of principals and the extent to which bureaucrats have
more information than their principals about the effects of bureaucratic decisions."
Johnson and Libecap studied federal career bureaucrats who
possess a great deal of autonomy from the executive branch and
Congress. The authors attribute this autonomy to the large number
of principals, informational asymmetries between federal bureaucrats
and the executive and legislative branches, and the protections of the
civil service system, as strengthened by a strong union.89 Accordingly,

84. JOHNSON &LIBECAP, supra note 82, at 163 (footnote omitted).
85. See id. at 163-66 (summarizing their evidence against hypothesis).
86. Faced with empirical data showing only a weak link between bureaucratic salaries
and the level and growth of the bureau's budget, Niskanen modified his model so that
bureaucrats seek to maximize the size of their discretionary budget, "defined as the difference between the total budget and the minimum cost of producing the output expected
by the political authorities." William A. Niskanen, A Reflection on Bureaucracyand Rep-

resentative Government, in THE

BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT:

APPRAISALS

AND EVIDENCE 13, 18 (Andr6 Blais & St6phane Dion eds., 1991). Because this surplus
may not be diverted to personal income, it is divided between the bureaucrats and political authorities through additional staff, capital, and perquisites for the bureaucrats, and
additional spending to serve the interests of the political review authorities. See id. at 19.
87. JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 82, at 167.
88. See, e.g., id. at 169 ("[T]he principal/agent problem encountered within the federal bureaucracy is a complex one. Voters, as the principals, are heterogeneous with
conflicting political objectives, and the supervisors of their agents, the president and the
Congress, have unclear political property rights over the bureaucracy.").
89. See id. at 167-71.
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such federal bureaucrats have many opportunities to act consistently
with their preferences. However, Professor Calvert and his coauthors have posited that even federal bureaucrats have less discretion when the executive and legislative branches care a great deal
about policy outcomes from the agency." In other words, discretion
is sometimes limited when high-salience issues arise.
Like bureaucrats, many judges have intense preferences on policy issues, and some desire to vote their values in deciding cases.
That desire, however, is tempered by the possibility of being denied
reappointment. Judges will deviate from voting their values when
they expect voting those values to diminish the chances of reappointment.
The likelihood that a judge standing for reappointment will deviate from voting her values depends in part upon the number of
reappointing authorities. Judges whose reappointment decision is
made by a legislature or governor alone9 have an incentive to decide
90. See Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of PoliticalControl and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 589-90 (1989); see also CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL
SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION passim (1995)
(examining federal judiciary as self-interested bureaucracy).
91. Fourteen states use a Missouri plan in which the governor chooses judicial candidates for the highest ranking judicial office from a list submitted to her by a nominally
independent commission; judges then run unopposed in retention elections. See BOOK OF
THE STATES, supra note 28, at 190-92 tbl.4.4. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. tbl.4.4. In addition, New Mexico's governor chooses
judicial candidates based on commission recommendations, but the candidates later run in
contested, partisan elections. See id. at 191 tbl.4.4. Each of these states should be considered elective states for purposes of the public choice analysis, because the renewal
decision depends upon a judgment by the voters.
In addition, eight states have appointment schemes in which the governor appoints
judicial candidates with confirmation from another body. See id. at 190-92 tbl.4.4. In
three states, California, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, the governor must consult
or obtain approval from an outside commission. See id. at 190-91 tbl.4A. In the other five
states, Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, Maine, and Vermont, Senate confirmation is required. See id. at 190-92 tbl.4.4. In addition, Senate confirmation is required for
gubernatorial nominations to New York's highest court. See id. at 191 tbl.4.4. Finally,
four states provide for legislative appointment of judges: Connecticut, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia. See id. at 190-91 tbl.4.4. In Connecticut, the legislature
chooses from among candidates submitted by the governor exclusively from candidates
submitted by a commission. See id. at 190 tbl.4.4.
Regarding renewal, California has retention elections for its appellate judges, and
superior court judges stand for reelection in a nonpartisan race unless unopposed (in
which case they are automatically reelected). See MATHIAS, supra note 4, at 144-45. In
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, all judges serve until age 70; in Rhode Island, judges
have life tenure. See id. In Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maine, the governor
reappoints judges subject to legislative approval. See id. In Hawaii, a commission determines if judges are reappointed. See id. In South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia, the
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cases in ways favorable to the reappointing body. But the incentive is
only a weak one because judges, like bureaucrats, have an information advantage over their reappointing principals, who may be unable
or unwilling to effectively monitor whether judges usually decide
cases in a way consistent with the principal's wishes.92 Still, the
greater the importance of the judge's position (such as serving on the
state's highest court) or of the case before the judge, the more likely
the principal will engage in effective monitoring. Therefore, judgeagents are unlikely to decide high-salience cases in a manner adverse
to their principals, for the same reason that vote-maximizing judges
are unlikely to decide high-salience cases in a manner adverse to the
voters or to their political benefactors.
Judges whose reappointment decision depends upon agreement
of two or more bodies should have even greater autonomy than
judges whose reappointment depends upon the one branch of government alone. Judicial outcomes, like bureaucratic outcomes, are
less predictable in an environment containing two principals with
sometimes competing goals. Specifically, a judge is more likely to
vote her values when the values of the judge's principals are in conflict. Because it is difficult to predict a judge's values, judicial
outcomes are often indeterminate. 9 Similarly, judges on higher
courts should have less discretion to decide cases in ways that deviate
from executive or legislative preferences than trial court judges belegislature reappoints judges. See id. In no state does the governor alone determine re-

appointment.
To summarize, 38 states use popular elections (retention or otherwise) for judicial

renewal, of which 23 states use partisan or nonpartisan competitive elections (assuming
New York is included, see supra note 28), 14 use retention elections under the Missouri
plan, and California uses a hybrid plan. One state, Hawaii, leaves the renewal decision to
a commission; four states leave the renewal decision to the legislature; four states use a
combination of gubernatorial and legislative renewal, and three states (Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) do not renew judges.
92. Here, I have assumed away the fact that legislatures are not unitary rational actors, but instead are collective bodies comprised of legislators whose interests are often at
odds with one another. To the extent there is divergence of opinion within a single body,

the principal-judge relationship will look more like the situation described below involving multiple principals.
93. That public choice theory predicts an indeterminate result in this context provides
an answer to Gordon's question regarding why the Delaware Supreme Court decided a
major corporate law case the way it did. See Gordon, supra note 22, at 1970-71. Reappointment in Delaware depends upon the actions of both the governor and legislature.
See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 28, at 190. Professor Pam Karlan observes that
judicial decisions under these circumstances also might be indeterminate because judges,
in their desire to please competing principals or future appointing authorities, could seek

out the muddy middle. Electronic Mail from Pam Karlan, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, to Richard Hasen (Sept. 30,1996) (on file with author).
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cause governors and legislators care more about the policy decisions
made by judges on higher courts.
In general, judges standing for reappointment appear to have
about as much autonomy from their principals as judges standing for
reelection. Most judicial decisions will be low-salience for the reappointing body. In rare cases in the lower courts, and somewhat more
frequently on the higher courts, judicial decisions will attract the attention of the reappointing body. When this occurs, and when a
judge believes she can correctly predict the preferences of the reappointing body, the judge is likely to vote consistently with that body's
preferences rather than with her own values when the two conflict.
Regarding high-salience issues, the Brace study found that
judges subject to legislative or gubernatorial reappointment were less
likely than judges standing for reelection to review abortion cases
under their discretionary review powers,94 but once judges standing
for reappointment decided these cases, "legislative/gubernatorial retention procedures do not exert a significantly appreciable effect on
justices' decisions to overturn [abortion] statutes.""
D. Life-Tenured Judges: Judges as Posners?
As Parts I.B and I.C demonstrate, judicial behavior depends not
so much upon the initialmethod of judicial selection as much as upon
judicial renewal mechanisms. Judges who stand for reelection have
incentives to decide cases in certain ways depending upon whether
the judge is running in a low-salience or high-salience election.
Similarly, judges considered for reappointment have a certain
amount of discretion in deciding cases, but that discretion is weakened when one authority has the power to appoint, or when the judge
is in an important judicial position or is deciding an important judicial
case. Under both renewal mechanisms, the more important the judicial position or the higher the profile of the case, the less likely it is
that the judge will act independently by voting her values.
This conclusion, however, ignores the critical issue of the timeframe for renewal. In general, the longer the term before a judge
stands for reelection or reappointment, the greater the amount of
judicial independence. When a judge decides a case at the beginning
of a long term, she can discount the expected cost of voting her val94. See Brace et al., supra note 70, at 10-11.

95. Id. at 13. The authors note that this result is "not surprising, given that the influence of this [legislative/gubernatorial retention] procedure at the agenda setting stage
effectively winnows out all but a small handful of cases." Id.
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ues that may be in conflict with the voters or appointing authorities
by the likelihood that the importance of the issue will fade over the
time before renewal.96 On the other hand, the closer it is to the renewal period, the less likely a judge will vote values that conflict with
the values of voters or appointing authorities. The Brace study found
that judges standing for reappointment became more likely to hear a
challenge to an abortion statute under the court's discretionary powers as the length of the judicial term increased."
Taken to its logical extreme, the best way to assure judicial independence is to extend the term of judges indefinitely, as done in the
federal system that provides life tenure for Article III judges except
in cases of egregiously bad conduct, like criminal activity. 8 When
judicial tenure is secure, a judge does not need to deviate from voting
her values to continue holding office. The Brace study confirms that
life tenure is positively correlated with a judge's willingness to overturn abortion statutes.9 Indeed, the only time a life-tenured judge is
likely to deviate from voting her values is when she believes doing so
would increase her chances of promotion to a higher judicial office or
another position or when she expects some personal financial gain.
Though these factors could influence an occasional case, they
should have little impact overall on judicial decisions. First, in most
cases, the chances of being promoted are low;"° second, the chances
are extremely slim that a judge's particular decision will affect the
likelihood of promotion."' Only when a judge decides a high-profile
96. See Hall, Justices, supra note 69, at 498 (voting against the death penalty on state
supreme courts is to some extent negatively correlated with the end of the judicial term).
As Eule notes, "[t]he ability to ignore the crocodile doubtless depends on how long before
you have to take a bath." Eule, supra note 58, at 1583 n.361.
97. See Brace et al., supranote 70, at 11. Surprisingly, the authors found no evidence

that term length mattered to judges standing for reelection. See id. at 12.
98. See Posner, supra note 16, at 4 ("Article III of the Constitution erects such a high
hurdle to removing a federal judge from office that pretty much the only thing that will
get him removed is criminal activity."). Alternatively, the best way to assure judicial

dependence on reelecting or reappointing authorities is to shorten judicial terms.
99. See Brace et al., supra note 70, at 13.

100. For an argument to the contrary regarding federal district court judges, see Mark
A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: EmpiricalEvidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L
RaV. L. & ECON. 13, 16 (1992) and Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or
What's "Unconstitutional"About the Sentencing Commission, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183,
188-89 (1991). But see Higgins & Rubin, supra note 22, at 137 (finding in empirical study

possibility of promotion not a good predictor ofjudicial decisionmaking).
101. See Posner, supra note 16, at 5. Though rare, a couple of recent instances suggest
federal judges have bowed to political pressure. Federal District Court Judge Harold
Baer, Jr. reversed a decision regarding the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case
after the issue became embroiled in the 1996 presidential race. He then decided to re-
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case is there any likelihood that the decision will affect the probability of promotion. As for financial gain, well-enforced bribery and
conflict-of-interest laws with onerous penalties will deter most of
these opportunities." 2
Why would a life-tenured judge vote her values rather than, say,
delegate the responsibility for deciding cases (as opposed to merely
writing opinions) to a law clerk, or, for that matter, decide cases using
the flip of a coin or a Ouija board? Posner's answer to this question
is unsatisfactory. Posner analogizes judges to individuals voting in
national elections, noting that many individuals vote in elections even
though voting is not compulsory and the chances of affecting the result of many elections is "vanishingly close to zero." ' From this fact,
Posner argues that "voting is a valued consumption activity of many
people""' and "judges are constantly voting, '.. 5 thereby gaining utility.
Although Posner notes that the chances of a judge affecting the
outcome of a case are much higher than the chances of an individual's vote affecting the outcome of an election,"' he fails to recognize
the implications of this difference for his model, suggesting that
[t]he pure utility of voting, when one's vote is highly unlikely to have any effect, is different from the "power trip"
aspect of voting. Most economic analyses of judicial behavior have been concerned with judges' power-not as a
source of deference or as the garnish on voting, as I am using it here, but as a source of satisfaction, or even of
exhilaration, akin to that experienced by creative people.
Artists makeworks of art that sometimes change sensibility;
judges make decisions that sometimes change social or
move himself from the case. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Baer Takes Himself Off Drug
Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1996, at B1. In addition, United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin stated in his resignation letter to President Clinton that he resigned from the court as a response to Republican political attacks on his

record. The resignation came just a few weeks after the judge requested to transfer his
offices from Newark to California. "That has led at least some judges to question
whether political attacks are the real reason Judge Sarokin decided to resign." Judge
Sarokin'sRetreat, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1996, at A30.
102. The absence of well-enforced laws should lead some wealth-maximizing judges to
decide some cases to maximize financial gain, as demonstrated by Chicago's Operation
Greylord, which led to the conviction of 15 judges on bribery and related charges. For a
retrospective, see Abdon M. Pallasch, Greylord'sLawyers and Judges Confront Life After

the Law, CHI.LAW., Sept. 1995, at 13.
103. Posner, supranote 16, at 16.
104. Id.
105. Id.

106. See id. ("Ajudge's vote sometimes decides the outcome of a case .....
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business practices. Artists impose their aesthetic vision on
society; judges impose their political vision on society....
My theory abstracts from these issues.... It thus is applicable to judges, I believe the majority, even on the Supreme
Court, who have no great interest in changing (or resisting
change in) law or society although they do obtain satisfaction from casting votes that are not merely symbolic
expressions, but count."

Nothing logically prevents Posner from relying upon the consumption model of voting to explain life-tenured judicial voting.
However, the consumption model of voting has proven to be extremely problematic for public choice theory, pointed to by some
scholars as evidence that economic models are useless to explain poBut the argument that life-tenured federal
litical phenomena.'
is in fact easierto fit into an economic model.
values
judges vote their
According to the most accepted public choice model of voting,
an individual votes rather than abstains whenever the costs of voting
are exceeded by the sum of the psychic benefits of voting and the
benefits the voter obtains by the election of the voter's preferred
candidate (or the voter's preference on a ballot initiative) multiplied
by the probability that the voter will cast the decisive ballot in the
election."' Recognizing that in most elections the probability of
casting a decisive ballot is close to zero,"' the equation reduces to the

107. Id. at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).

108. See DONALD P. GREEN &

IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE

47-71 (1994); Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Rational Citizen Faces Election Day
or What Rational Choice Theorists Don't Tell You about American Elections, in
ELECTIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD 71, 71 (M. Kent Jennings & Thomas E. Mann eds.,
1994) ("The inescapable conclusion is that rational choice theory is inherently unsuited
to illuminating voter turnout."). For a detailed examination of rational choice models of
voting, and for the development of an alternative norms-based model, see Richard L.
Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135,2138-64 (1996).
109. More formally, the voter decides to vote rather than abstain from voting whenever pB - C + D > 0, where B is "the differential benefit, in utiles, that an individual voter
receives from the success of his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one," p
is the probability a citizen by voting will bring about B, where 0 < p < 1, C is the cost to
the individual of the act of voting, and D is the utility of other psychic benefits of voting,
including "satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting." William H. Riker &
Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 25, 28
(1968).
110. Riker and Ordeshook estimate the value for p in an American presidential election "as p = 10-8, and my rough calculations indicate my chances of determining who
becomes President are of about [the] same order of magnitude as my chances of being
killed driving to the polls-hardly a profitable venture." Paul E. Meehl, The Selfish Voter
Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 11, 11 (1977)
(footnotes omitted).
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expression that people vote when the psychic benefits of voting exceed the costs. This, in turn, demonstrates the consumption value of
voting. The model rightfully has been criticized as a tautology;. the
expression can explain neither who votes, nor why the number of
people voting changes over time."'
We know citizens sometimes don't vote, but judges rarely fail to
vote. The model presented above easily explains the difference: The
case for rational judicial voting is much stronger than the case for rational consumer voting. For judicial voting, the probability of casting
a decisive ballot is high: for trial court judges, the probability is 1,
putting aside the possibility of reversal; for appellate judges, the
probability will be some non-negligible fraction between 0 and 1, depending upon how many other judges sit on a panel deciding the case.
So long as the benefit of voting for a particular outcome (or what I
have termed here a judge "voting her values") is a non-trivial number, the probability of casting the decisive ballot is generally
sufficiently high to render it rational for a judge to vote, and particularly to vote her values, in order to gain the desired outcome."3 The
case for a judge voting her values is even stronger because of the lack
of a secret ballot on judicial panels. On a three-judge panel, for example, a judge who knows the votes of the two other members and
knows the likelihood of affecting the votes of the other two members
easily can calculate the probability of casting a decisive ballot.

111. See BRIAN M. BARRY, SOCIOLOGIsTs, ECONOMISTS & DEMOCRACY 16 (1970)
(arguing that Riker and Ordeshook's analysis "does not leave any scope for an economic
model to come between the premises and the phenomenon to be explained. Instead, the
question shifts back to: 'Why do some people have this kind of motivation more strongly
than others?' ").
112. See Hasen, supranote 108, at 2141-43.
113. Momentarily putting aside the D term, see supra note 109, a judge votes because
pB > C. Though Posner missed the point, his colleague at the University of Chicago and
on the Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook, did not. As Easterbrook explained in a
recent case:
Because no single person's vote affects the outcome of a plebiscite, the voters do

not invest heavily in information; rational ignorance is the order of the day ....

Professional legislators not only have more time to brush up on the facts but also
more reason to do so, because votes in a smaller assembly are more likely to be
dispositive.
Marusic Liquors, Inc. v. Daley, 55 F.3d 258,262 (7th Cir. 1995). Like legislators, votes in
small judicial panels are more likely to be dispositive.
Posner may also be correct that some judges vote because D, the psychic benefits of
voting, are higher among judges than in the general population. This provides one possi-

ble explanation for why judges bother to dissent rather than not vote. Another possible

explanation for dissents, however, is that judges hope to influence future cases through
their dissents; that is, judges use dissents to vote their values.

1997]

HIGH COURT WRONGLY ELECTED

1335

E. Conclusion
The public choice analysis of judging demonstrates the unreliability of the common wisdom that judicial elections promote judicial
accountability and judicial appointments promote judicial independence. In fact, most judges can vote their values, that is, act
independently, most of the time, whether they are elected or appointed. Occasionally a high-salience case will lead a trial court
judge subject to reelection or reappointment to deviate from voting
her values in order to curry favor with voters or the appointing
authorities, but those cases are rare.
Judges sitting on higher level courts are more likely to make decisions in high-salience cases than lower court judges. Sometimes, for
reasons explained above, high court judges will not vote their values,
but instead will be subject to majoritarian pressures or pressures from
the reappointing body. At other times, elected high court judges may
decide certain cases consonant with the values of their campaign contributor-principals rather than their own values or the values of a
majority of voters. Lengthening judicial terms, whether judges eventually stand for reelection or reappointment, removes some of the
disincentives for judges to vote their values, and lifetime judicial tenure removes nearly all disincentives for judges to vote their values.
Using this public choice model of judging, and particularly the
insights on when judges should be expected to act independently and
not to do so, I turn my attention in Part II to examining judicial elections under the Voting Rights Act and to how the public choice
model resolves two important VRA issues.

II. USING PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS
BETWEEN STATE INTERESTS IN JUDICIAL SELECTION MECHANISMS
AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A. Introduction: JudicialElections and the Voting Rights Act
States have experimented with various judicial selection mechanisms since the early days of the Republic.'14 But the ability of states
to continue such experimentation has changed since 1991, when the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that judicial elections are subject
to the Voting Rights Act."5 On the one hand, suits brought under
section 2 of the VRA have forced a number of states to restructure
114. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 130,192-95 and accompanying text.
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their judicial selection mechanisms. 6 On the other hand, section 5 of
the VRA, which requires that jurisdictions with a history of racial
discrimination (so-called "covered jurisdictions") submit proposed
changes to their judicial election plans to preclearance by a court or
the Attorney General of the United States, may have deterred some
states from restructuring their judicial selection mechanisms. 7
Using the public choice model of judging developed in Part I,
this Part considers two issues illustrating the tension between each
state's interest in choosing its judicial selection mechanisms and the
VRA goals of assuring equal political participation by minority
groups. 18 First, states have defended the practice of electing judges
from multimember districts against a claim of minority vote dilution
under section 2 by arguing that judicial independence requires maintaining the "linkage" between a judge's territorial jurisdiction and its
electoral base; according to these states, a move to single-member
judicial subdistricts would create the appearance and actuality of bias
by judges in favor of subdistrict voters. Second, states involved in
section 2 litigation or subject to preclearance under section 5 may be
precluded from moving to a system of lifetime judicial appointments.
Striking the appropriate balance between the goals of federalism
and the VRA when both interests are strong and in direct conflict is
exceedingly difficult. Regarding the first question, however, the
model shows that a state's legitimate interest in preserving judicial
independence is not furthered by maintaining multimember judicial
districts. Accordingly, courts should reject the linkage argument and
apply the VRA with full force.
The second question requires a much more difficult balancing:
A state with an interest in fostering judicial independence, particularly among its higher court judges, may achieve that goal through
116. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.2.

117. See infra Part II.C.3.
118. Because of the limited focus of this article, I can safely ignore much of the morass

surrounding interpretation of precisely what constitutes a section 2 violation. Thus, it is
not necessary to delve here into the detailed legislative history of the original VRA or of

the significant 1982 amendments. Nor need I consider here the serious and important
debate over whether the amended VRA in general constitutes good legislation. For an
attack from the right on section 2 and the VRA generally, see ABIGAIL M. THERN.
STROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING

RIGHTS passim (1987). For an attack from the left, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY

OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRAcY passim (1994). For a discussion of the many thorny issues surrounding interpretation of
section 2, and a good bibliography, see DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 183-207 (1995). The brief description of the amended section 2
which follows will suffice to explain the issues discussed in this Article.
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lifetime judicial appointment. Fortunately, the model shows that a
move to judicial appointment often will not adversely affect the
VRA's goals of assuring adequate minority representation. For this
reason, Congress should amend the VRA, if necessary, to allow
courts in appropriate circumstances to approve a state's plan to move
to lifetime judicial appointment.
B. Section 2 Vote Dilution and the State's Spurious Interestin
"Linkage"

Section 2 of the VRA provides that states and political subdivisions may not impose voting qualifications, prerequisites to voting, or
a standard, practice, or procedure "which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, or [membership in a designated language
minority group].""1 9 A minority plaintiff establishes such a violation
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members [of a protected class of citizens] in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the golitical process and to
elect representatives of their choice.
A minority plaintiff need not prove that the jurisdiction enacted
a voting practice or procedure with an intent to discriminate against
the minority plaintiffs. The Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden"'
interpreted the original section 2 to require proof of such intent, but
Congress amended section 2 to eliminate the intent requirement 2
and to replace it with a "results test": 22 Section 2 is violated so long as
the practice or procedure results in the dilution of minority voting
power.124
119. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). Designated language
minority groups are listed in id. § 1973b(f)(2).

120. Id. § 1973(b).
121. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
122. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15-16

(1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,192-93. The intent requirement still applies to
claims of constitutionalvote dilution. On constitutional vote dilution, see infra note 124.
123. The Senate Report listed "typical factors" that might be probative of a section 2
violation. See S. REp. No. 97-417, at 28-29, reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07; see
also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 n.4, 43-44 (describing Congressional intent to "dispositively
reject[] the position of the plurality" in Mobile v. Bolden).
124. "Dilution ...occurs when the votes of some identifiable group count for less than
the votes of other voters. Dilution can occur because of malapportionment, the use of atlarge elections, or gerrymandering that 'cracks' or 'packs' a group's voting strength into a
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A simple example illustrates a typical section 2 vote dilution
challenge to a multimember districting scheme. Suppose a city council has five members, and every voter in the city may vote for
candidates to fill all five positions, thus forming an "at-large" electoral system.
African-Americans make up 30% of the city
population, but no candidates preferred by a majority of AfricanAmericans have ever been elected to the city council. AfricanAmericans may bring a section 2 vote dilution suit, claiming that had
the city been divided into five separate districts with carefully drawn
district lines, African-Americans would have had enough voting
power to elect at least one of their preferred candidates.
In Thornburg v. Gingles,1 ' the Supreme Court set forth a threeprong threshold test for determining whether a multimember dissuboptimal number of districts." Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:
Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 287, 289 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Although parts of section 2 appear to endorse a right to proportional representation
of minority interests, other language in the section explicitly negates such a right. As part
of a compromise engineered by Senator Bob Dole during the 1982 amendment process,
see THERNSTROM, supra note 118, at 135-36, section 2 states that "nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
Constitutionalvote dilution challenges to judicial elections also differ in a significant
way from constitutional vote dilution challenges of other elections. In Wells v. Edwards,
409 U.S. 1095 (1973) (mem.), affg 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972), the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed a three-judge court which rejected the idea that the one-person, onevote Equal Protection Clause principle mandating that "[a voter has a] right to have his
own vote given as much weight, as far as practicable, as that of any other voter," Hadley
v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52 (1970), applies to judicial elections. For an argument that "courts extend the application of the one-person, one-vote standard to judicial
elections when such elections are challenged on grounds of racial discrimination," see
Andrew S.Marovitz, Note, Castinga Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person, One-Vote
to JudicialElections Involving Racial Discrimination,98 YALE L.J. 1193, 1195-96 (1989).
Given the Wells case, determining whether section 2 vote dilution has occurred in judicial
elections is difficult. The Supreme Court noted this difficulty but found it irrelevant in
determining whether section 2 applies to judicial elections: "Even if serious problems lie
ahead in applying the 'totality of circumstances' standard described in § 2(b), that task,
difficult as it may prove to be, cannot justify a judicially created limitation on the coverage of the broadly worded statute, as enacted and amended by Congress." Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991). But cf.Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327, 332 (S.D.
Miss. 1988) (stating that although the one-person, one-vote doctrine is not applicable to
judicial districts, "general equity requires that population variance should be minimized
between sub-districts"); Robert B. McDuff, JudicialElections and the Voting Rights Act,
38 LOY. L.REV. 931, 973 (1993) ("Although the one-person, one-vote rule is not an independent requirement ...it is a tool by which courts easily have measured what they view
to be the potential for undiluted minority voting strength."); Frederick G. Slabach, Equal
Justice: Applying the Voting Rights Act to JudicialElections, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 84249 (1994) (arguing that the one-person, one-vote standard is "not essential" for evaluating
claim of vote dilution in judicial election scheme).
125. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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tricting scheme," like the one in my example, constitutes vote dilu-

tion in violation of section 2:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it
is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute

a majority in a single-member district.... Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive.... Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it-in the absence of special circumstances, such as
the minority candidate running unopposed... to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.1 27
If plaintiffs meet the threshold test, the court must examine the
"totality of circumstances" to determine if impermissible vote dilution has occurred. 2s These circumstances include any history of
voting-related discrimination in the jurisdiction, the use of racial appeals in political campaigns, and the extent to which minority group
members bear the effects of past discrimination in other areas which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process."
Since the Supreme Court held in 1991 that section 2 applies to
judicial elections," ° such cases generally have followed the pattern of
section 2 litigation described above. Courts have required proof of
the three Gingles threshold factors as an initial requirement to challenge a judicial election scheme,'3' and, if plaintiffs meet the
126. The Court declined to address whether the amended section 2 permits other vote
dilution claims brought by minority plaintiffs and, if so, the standards that should pertain
to them. See id. at 46 n.12. In Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993), the Court held
that the Ginglestest applies to claims of vote dilution in single-member districts.
127. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 (footnotes omitted). For an argument that this threshold test violates the "Dole compromise" prohibiting the requirement of proportional
representation, see Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the
Problem of Racial GerrymanderingUnder the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652,
657-59 (1993).
128. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011-12 (1994).
129. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45.
130. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,384 (1991). For a history of this issue before
Chisom, see Slabach, supra note 124, at 833-34. On the same day the Court decided
Chisom, it also decided Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991). In that
case, the Court rejected an argument that section 2 does not apply to trial judges because
they occupy "single-member offices." Id. at 426. For a critical discussion of the singlemember office theory, see Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single Member
Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1 (1991). See also Richard Saks, Note,
Redemption or Exemption?: Racial Discriminationin JudicialElections Under the Voting
Rights Act, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 245, 285-96 (1990) (arguing against theory's application
to judicial elections).
131. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens for Equality v. McDonald, 63 F.3d 413,416 (5th Cir.
1995) (affirming district court dismissal of case challenging judicial election system for
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threshold, they must prove vote dilution under a totality of circumstances."i
Courts, however, have modified the totality of circumstances test
for judicial elections. In particular, two circuits have held that a state
has a substantial interest in maintaining a "linkage" between a trial
judge's electorate and its jurisdiction, and that "[t]his substantial
state interest may be overcome only by evidence that amounts to
substantial proof of racial dilution. Otherwise, the at-large election
of district court judges does not violate § 2.'" In support of modifying the totality of circumstances test for judicial elections, these
courts pointed to a dictum in Houston Lawyers' Association v.
Texas,M in which the Supreme Court noted that
the State's interest in maintaining an electoral system-in
these cases, Texas' interest in maintaining the link between
a district judge's jurisdiction and the area of residency of his
or her voters-is a legitimate factor to be considered by
courts among the "totality of circumstances" in determining

failure to meet the first prong of the Gingles test).
132. See, e.g., Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143, 1148 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1993)
(failing to reach totality of circumstances inquiry in plaintiffs' challenge to judicial election plan because plaintiffs failed to first meet the Gingles criteria).
133. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC IV), 999 F.2d 831,
868 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568, 576-77 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding that state has substantial interest in electing judges from an at-large jurisdiction and remanding to district court with instructions to weigh state's interest against
evidence bearing on factors of vote dilution). A district court recently followed these
courts' lead, in a case currently on appeal. See Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v.
Thompson, 935 F. Supp. 1419, 1430-31 (E.D. Wis. 1996). In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that although the linkage may be of limited
relevance in determining if vote dilution has occurred, it "plays a major role in our consideration of the remedies" proposed as alternatives to the challenged electoral schemes.
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995).
These courts also have questioned whether the appropriate benchmark for measuring
vote dilution in judicial election cases is the percentage of attorneys eligible to run for
judicial office who are minority group members or the percentage of the voting-age
population in a given district who are minority group members. The Fifth Circuit held
that the percentage of eligible attorneys is relevant. See LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 837.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the approach. See Nipper v. Smith, 1 F.3d at 1183, rev'd on
othergrounds, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995).
For a detailed analysis and argument against the eligible attorneys standard, see John S.
Wills, Comment, Statistical Pools and ElectoralSuccess in Vote-Dilution Cases, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 527 (1995); see also McDuff, supra note 124, at 970 ("The argument that
the low number of minority judges is caused by the low number of minority attorneys,
rather than the election systems, finds little support in the evidence."). But see infra notes
218-24 and accompanying text (noting empirical evidence supporting such a claim).
134. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
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whether a § 2 violation has occurred.13
Commentators have argued that the Houston Lawyers' Association dictum should not be followed because it constitutes a
misreading of the amended section 2. They contend that the
state's
interest should be irrelevant in determining whether minorities have
been deprived of an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 36 This argument
appears consistent with section 2's express language describing a
violation,
which fails to address state interests that could trump that
1 37
right.
Even if courts ignore the commentators and continue to consider
the state's linkage interest in the totality of circumstances, public
choice concerns should compel them to give the interest little weight.
To understand why, consider the Fifth Circuit's articulation of
Texas's alleged linkage interest:
The electoral bases of district judges are linked to the area
over which they exercise primary jurisdiction. This linkage
has been in place throughout the 143 year history of judicial
elections in Texas. By making coterminous the electoral
and jurisdictional bases of trial courts, Texas advances the
effectiveness of its courts by balancing the virtues of accountability with the need for independence. The state
attempts to maintain the fact and appearance of judicial
fairness that are central to the judicial task, in part, by insuring that judges remain accountable to the range of
people within their jurisdiction. A broad base diminishes
the semblance of bias and favoritism towards the parochial
interests of a narrow constituency. Appearances are critical
because "the very perception of impropriety and unfairness
undermines the moral authority of the courts."... The sys135. Id. at 426-27.
136. See Slabach, supra note 124, at 864-65; see also McDuff, supra note 124, at 960
("[S]tate interests should be considered not during the liability portion of a judicial districting case but at the remedy phase."); Brenda Wright, The Bench and the Ballot:
Applying the Protectionsof the Voting Rights Act to JudicialElections, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 669, 682 (1992) ("Permitting state interests to trump a showing of vote dilution not
only is inconsistent with specific provisions of the Senate Report but also would directly
undermine the primary purpose behind the 1982 amendment of Section 2."); Kirsten
Lundgaard Izatt, Note, The Voting Rights Act and JudicialElections: Accommodating the
Interests of States Without Compromising the Goals of the Act, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 229,
252 (arguing against considering state interests until the remedy stage). Even the court in
Nipper recognized the "minimal relevance" of state interests in determining if vote dilution has occurred. See Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1542.
137. See supra text accompanying note 120 (setting forth section 2's relevant language).
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temic incentives of subdistricting are those of ward politics,
and would "diminish the appearance if not fact of its judicial
independence-a core element of a judicial office."''
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, in rejecting a subdistricting remedy
for judicial elections in Florida, noted that "[t]he implementation of
subdistricts would increase the potential for 'home cooking' by creating a smaller electorate and thereby placing added pressure on
elected judges to favor constituents-especially as election time approaches."'39
Despite the conjecture of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, a public choice analysis provides no evidence that trial court judges elected
from smaller subdistricts would tend to engage in "home cooking,"
that is, to favor subdistrict voters, in deciding cases. Almost all trial
court elections are low-salience events, so little reason exists to indicate that voters would obtain information regarding whether trial
judges have favored constituents appearing before them. Because
subdistricts usually will encompass large areas with thousands of
people, the chances of a voter fortuitously learning that the local trial
judge is engaged in home cooking is minuscule. Even if a voter
learns that another voter prevailed in the trial judge's court against
someone outside the district, such information does not necessarily
indicate home cooking: How is a voter to evaluate whether the judge
has made a biased decision rather than one based on the merits of the
case?
Perhaps more importantly, voters would have little incentive to
vote for a judge if they knew she was deciding cases in favor of subdistrict voters. Unless a voter expects that she (or perhaps a family
member or close friend) was likely to have business before the subdistrict trial judge in particular, a voter may look with disfavor on
home cooking. Furthermore, to the extent that a voter has family or
friends outside the subdistrict who may appear with court business
before the judge, the voter is more likely to prefer an impartial judiciary that does not engage in home cooking."
138. LULAC IV, 999 F.2d at 869 (internal citations omitted).
139. Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1544.
140. Though many people may be expected to have friends and family outside the
subdistrict, many fewer would be expected to have friends outside the state. Because
home cooking that favors state residents over out-of-state residents could be in the self-

interest of some elected judges, federal law provides for removal of cases involving citizens of different states to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994), amended by Act of
October 19,1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996) (to be codified at

28 U.S.C. § 1332) (diversity jurisdiction); id. § 1441 (1994) (removal). But the need for
diversity jurisdiction to counter local bias even on the state level has been challenged for
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Because voters generally will not learn about a judge engaging in
home cooking, and because they would not be likely to prefer home
cooking even if they learned of it, rational judges hoping for reelection have little reason to engage in the practice. In fact, if voters do
learn of the practice, a judge who engages in it may appear less than
impartial and for that reason may lose votes." Put simply, no real
danger to judicial independence arises from the creation of smaller
subdistricts.
That leaves the matter of the "appearance" or "semblance" of
bias stemming from the practice of judicial subdistricting. 42 The con-

cern here is similarly misguided. The elections of trial court judges
are not alone in their status as low-salience events; court business,
decisionmaking, trials, and structure are low-salience as well.

To

imagine that voters will lose confidence in the independence of the
judiciary if it decouples territorial jurisdiction and the electoral base
is to have an overactive imagination. Nothing is "substantial'"
about this asserted state interest, especially in a state like Texas,
which condones campaign contributions from lawyers and lawyer and
industry PACs to the very judges hearing their clients' cases." Given
this more serious appearance of bias, Texas's concern over "linkage"
appears unjustified.
The size of districts used for electing trial court judges should
have no effect on judicial independence; judges elected at-large or in
subdistricts will be free to vote their values most of the time and the
latter will have little reason to engage in home cooking. However,
jurisdictions may take other steps to increase or decrease judicial independence. In particular, lengthening the judicial term will increase
independence while shortening it will decrease independence, particularly for higher court judges. The question arises, then, whether
jurisdictions wishing to increase judicial independence should be allowed to increase the judicial term indefinitely, and, for reasons
explained below, couple that with initial appointment. Part II.C considers such a change.

quite some time. See David P. Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute,
36 U. CHI. L. RaV. 1, 5-8 (1968).
141. See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting that it is rational for vote maximizers to avoid the appearance of corruption).

142. LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 869.
143. See

MATHIAS,

supra note 4, at 17 (citing study showing widespread voter igno-

rance about how the court system works).
144. LULACIV, 999 F.2d at 868.

145. See supra notes 65,80 and accompanying text.
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C. Lifetime JudicialAppointment and the VRA
1. Introduction
Part I explained that jurisdictions wishing to promote the goal of
judicial independence, particularly the independence of judges on the
jurisdiction's highest court, who are most likely to be involved in
high-salience elections, should move to lengthen judicial terms or to
grant judges life tenure. This goal would not contradict the requirements of the VRA so long as the lifetime judges were chosen through
elections that otherwise comply with the VRA.
However, jurisdictions that wish to move to life tenure of judges
may want to choose their judges initially through an appointment
process, rather than an election. In terms of judicial independence,
the choice does not matter,1" but it may affect the quality and competence of judicial candidates. Unlike voters, who have an incentive to
remain ignorant about judicial candidates, 7 governors and legislators
have a rational incentive to investigate judicial appointees's suitability to the office. An out-of-control life-tenured judge (compared to a
judge appointed for a shorter term) will reflect poorly on an appointing authority who seeks reelection.'48
For this reason, state officials possess a legitimate and strong interest in preferring that life-tenured judges initially be appointed
rather than elected.'49 Indeed, it should come as no surprise that no
146. See supraPart I.D.
147. See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 101 (recounting Republican attempt to use President Clinton's
judicial appointment of Judge Baer to argue that Clinton exercised poor judgment in
choosing judicial candidates).
149. The separate public choice question of why vote-maximizing legislators rationally
would choose an independent judiciary over a judiciary subject to periodic renewal remains. This issue has spawned its ovm literature, beginning with Landes and Posner, who
argued that legislatures may favor an independent judiciary because it performs a crucial
role in enforcing contracts between interest groups and legislatures. See Landes & Posner, Independent Judiciary, supra note 22, at 894. Further research has refined this
hypothesis. See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers,32 J.L. & ECON. 215, 226 (1989) (finding evidence that judges are
rewarded with higher salaries for judicial independence); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A ComparativeApproach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 722
(1994) (finding that legislatures prefer independent judiciaries only "where they rate (i)
the likelihood of continued electoral government high and (ii) the likelihood of their continued victory low"). But see Gordon, supra note 22, at 1968 n.136 (arguing that evidence
of Anderson and his co-authors is unconvincing because judicial salaries cannot be individually set and a prisoners' dilemma may arise).
In any case, a change in judicial selection mechanisms must be accomplished by a
popular, not legislative, vote in many states, and voters may not always support the plan.
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5°
American jurisdiction couples life tenure with judicial elections.'

Nor does any state rest the power to decide upon judicial appointment for life in a single politician, like the governor. In the states
providing for life tenure of judges or something close to it-Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey-more than
one individual controls the decision. 5 ' The same is true of the federal
system of appointing life-tenured judges. 52 Similarly, no state gives
one individual, such as the governor, the sole power to determine judicial reappointment.'53
Though the concept of lifetime judicial appointment hardly is
controversial by itself, the matter becomes controversial when the
jurisdiction wishing to move to lifetime appointment has had its judicial election system declared in violation of section 2 of the VRA, or
is subject to administrative preclearance under section 5 of the VRA.
Part II.C.2 explains that states may not be able to implement a system of lifetime judicial appointments after a court has determined
that the state's current method for electing judges results in section 2
vote dilution and argues that section 2 should be amended if necessary to allow states to do so. Part II.C.3 similarly explains that
covered jurisdictions may not be able to obtain section 5 preclearance
for a move to lifetime judicial appointments, and that Congress
should amend section 5 if necessary to allow such a move in appropriate circumstances.
2. Lifetime Judicial Appointment May Be an Impermissible
Section 2 "Remedy"
To understand why a state involved in section 2 litigation may be
barred from instituting a system of lifetime judicial appointment,
some background on section 2 remedies is necessary. Once a court
has determined that a jurisdiction's electoral plan has resulted in minority vote dilution, the state must be given an opportunity to
propose a remedial plan before the court imposes a remedy." In section 2 litigation involving multimember districts, as in the example

Voters in some states have rejected a change from judicial elections to the Missouri plan.
See Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit Judicial Selection on the
Ballot,73 JUDICATURE 238 (1990).

150. See Croley, supra note 4, at 725-26.
151. See supranote 91 and accompanying text.
152. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that President chooses judges with the advice
and consent of the Senate).
153. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
154. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37,41 (1982).
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above, 55 the state and the plaintiffs often will present alternative
plans redrawing district lines using only single-member districts. In
redrawing the district lines, the state must present a plan creating sufficient districts in which minority populations constitute a majority of
the district's members (so-called "majority-minority" districts" 6) so
that the minority's vote is no longer "diluted" under the Gingles criteria.
In the last few years, however, Supreme Court cases holding that
use of race as a "predominant factor" in redistricting violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution have
called this approach into question.157 Constitutional constraints on
one end and section 2 requirements on the other have put a squeeze
on courts attempting to use redistricting to remedy vote dilution.5 '
155. See supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
156. Some in the civil rights community refer to these districts as "black opportunity
districts." See Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Arguments on Race in Redistricting,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1995, at Bl. But see id (" 'What are "black opportunity" districts?' Justice Scalia demanded. 'You can call them motherhood-apple pie districts if you like, but
you'll be insulting my intelligence every time you do it. Can't you give them unemotive
terminology?'" (quoting Justice Scalia's response to a Texas special assistant attorney
general's use of the term in oral argument in Shaw v. Hunt, 117 S. Ct. 43 (1996))).
157. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2494 (1995). The Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement in the area has not significantly eliminated the confusion surrounding the extent race may or must be taken into account in redistricting. In Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), the Justices filed six separate opinions, including a separate
concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, who also wrote the opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court.
158. The Supreme Court is considering this issue in Johnson v. Miller, 922 F. Supp.
1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), review granted sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (U.S.
May 20, 1996) (No. 95-1425), and review grantedsub nom. United States v. Johnson, 116
S. Ct. 1823 (U.S. May 20, 1996) (No. 95-1460). The cases also put a squeeze on legislators
engaged in redistricting who hope to avoid a court challenge to the redistricting plan under either the Constitution or section 2. See Karlan, supra note 124, at 306-10. Karlan
explains:
If [jurisdictions] do not draw majority-black districts in most areas with substantial black populations, they will both find it difficult to obtain preclearance
[under section 5] and, if they do, will face traditional section 2 lawsuits. But if
they do draw those districts, they will find themselves embroiled in wrongful districting litigation.
Id. at 310. Justice O'Connor's separate concurring opinion in Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct.
1941 (1996), along with the opinions of the four dissenting justices, has alleviated the
squeeze placed on legislators by suggesting that compliance with section 2 is a compelling
interest justifying race-based districting. See id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plurality begins with the perfectly obvious assumption[] that a State has a compelling interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act."); id at 2007 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that Justice O'Connor's separate opinion on this point "virtually insulate[s] the Voting Rights Act from jeopardy under Shaw as
such"). The plaintiffs nonetheless lost in Bush v. Vera because Justice O'Connor, along
with four other justices, held that the districts were not narrowly tailored to meet the
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Faced with these problems, some commentators have advocated
employing novel voting methods as remedies that would not require
a change from at-large voting or multimember districts. For example,
under cumulative voting,
[v]oters receive as many votes to cast as there are seats to
fill; voters then may distribute these multiple votes among
candidates in any way they prefer. Thus, voters may
"plump" all their votes on one candidate-the strategy of
choice for minority groups with intense preferences for a
particular candidate-or give one vote each to several candidates.... If the voters in a sufficiently large minority
group concentrate all their votes on the same candidate,
they can assure that candidate's election regardless of how
other voters, including a majority of voters, cast their ballots. 9
These novel voting methods have enjoyed support from some
scholars,"6° and cumulative voting has been instituted as a means of
settling section 2 litigation in Maryland and Alabama.' However,
the Fourth Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for a district
court to impose cumulative voting as a remedy for a section 2 violation without giving the county an opportunity to submit a singlemember district plan remedy, 62 and Justice Thomas described these
(assumed) compelling interest of complying with section 2. See id. at 1961 ("These characteristics [of the districts] defeat any claim that the districts are narrowly tailored to
serve the State's interest in avoiding liability under § 2."); id.
at 1974 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he State's redistricting attempts were not narrowly tailored to
achieve its asserted interest.").
159. Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United
States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 254. Along similar lines, the authors assert that limited voting
works by giving voters fewer votes to cast than the total number of seats at issue.
Thus, if five seats on a city council are to be filled, voters throughout the city
might each be permitted to cast only two votes. The effect of limiting each voter
to two votes is to prevent the same majority from dominating each and every
seat. Well-organized minority groups that are sufficiently large are thereby enabled to control the outcome of at least one seat.
Id. at 253.
160. See, e.g.,
GUINIER, supra note 118, at 99-101 (supporting cumulative voting, or
"interest representation"); Richard Briffault, Lani Guinierand the Dilemmas ofAmerican
Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418, 435-41 (1995) (supporting alternative voting); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 223-36 (1989) (supporting
limited voting and cumulative voting).
161. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 118, at 199.
162. See Cane v. Worcester County, 35 F.3d 921, 923, 927 (4th Cir. 1994). After the
case was remanded, the district court again mandated cumulative voting as a remedy. See
Cane v. Worcester County, 874 F. Supp. 687, 693-94 (D. Md.), rev'd, 59 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.
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novel voting methods as unwelcome "radical departures from the
electoral systems with which we are most familiar."'" Moreover,
these novel voting methods may not be used for elections to the
United States House of Representatives, which by statute must be
conducted in single-member districts.'" For these reasons, novel
voting methods have not been implemented widely to remedy section
2 vote dilution.
Subdistricting and novel voting methods also are available to
remedy vote dilution in judicial elections, but, as with non-judicial
elections, courts have been reluctant to use either method.6 ' This
raises the possibility of using judicial appointment as a remedy. Unlike other remedies, however, appointment hardly looks like a
remedy for a claim of vote dilution: It is indeed odd to say that the
1995) (unpublished table decision). On appeal, all parties urged that the cumulative voting scheme imposed by the district court be rejected, and the court of appeals agreed. See
Cane v. Worcester County, 59 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision), cert.
dismissed in part,116 S.Ct. 980, and cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2546 (1996). The unpublished
Fourth Circuit opinion is available in Westlaw, Nos. 95-112, 95-1688, 1995 WL 371008
(4th Cir. June 16, 1995).
163. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,910 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
164. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994).
165. See supra Part II.B (discussing courts' reluctance to allow subdistricting on
grounds that it threatens judicial independence). Courts have shown similar hostility
toward use of novel voting methods in judicial election vote dilution cases. In Martin v.
Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988), the district court rejected a limited voting
scheme to remedy a vote dilution claim involving judicial elections on grounds that
"limited voting is experimental and contrary to most election laws of Mississippi and the
policy contained therein. It is also contrary to most general concepts of a democratic twoparty system." Id. at 337; see also Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1994)
(en bane) (rejecting cumulative voting as an appropriate remedy for vote dilution in
Florida's judicial system), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995); League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC IV), 999 F.2d 831, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting cumulative and limited voting remedies to vote dilution caused by at-large voting on the
curious grounds that the mechanisms "are not 'remedies' for the particular structural
problem that the plaintiffs have chosen to attack"). But see Cousin v. Sundquist, No. 1:90CV 339, slip op. at 12-13 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 1996) (imposing cumulative voting in judicial
elections); Thomas P. Prehoditch, The Voting Rights Act and JudicialSelection Litigation:
An Evaluation of Remedial Options, 11 REV. LITIG. 523, 564-67 (1992) (advocating limited voting as remedy for vote dilution in judicial elections); Edward Still, Voluntary
Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.354, 354-69 (1991) (advocating limited voting
and cumulative voting for judicial elections); Ronald W. Chapman, Comment, Judicial
Roulette: Alternatives to Single-Member Districts as a Legal and PoliticalSolution to Voting-Rights Challenges to At-Large JudicialElections, 48 SMU L. REV. 457, 469-72 (1995)
(discussing benefits of cumulative voting in judicial elections); Shawn Fremstad, Note,
State JudicialElections and the Voting Rights Act: Defining the ProperRemedial Scheme,
76 MINN. L. REV. 101, 124-25 (1991) (advocating cumulative voting and limited voting for
trial court elections and subdistricting for appellate court elections); Mona Hymel, Note,
Judicial Electoral Systems: Foreign Democracies Provide Solutions, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J.
447,460 (1992) (advocating limited voting for judicial elections).
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cure for the dilution of some people's votes is to take away everyone's
right to vote, and an appointment remedy rarely has been proposed
outside the judicial election context.'6 But appointment historically
has been a permissible alternative to the election of judges, and the
Supreme Court itself suggested in Chisom v. Roemer that Louisiana
could extricate itself from VRA requirements by switching from judicial elections to judicial appointment.167
No court has decided whether a court may impose lifetime judicial appointment as a section 2 remedy. One court recently noted in
dicta that a judicial appointment remedy might be foreclosed on
grounds that "[j]udicial nominating commissions and the appointment process in general remove any choice from the voters," and that
removing power to elect judges "would trample the longstanding
value the State places on electing all of its public officials.' 1 8 In addi166. For an instance outside the judicial context in which a court approved a section 2
settlement that included the temporary appointment of an official, see Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 748 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Ala. 1990), wherein the court noted:
Admittedly, the court was troubled initially by the fact that the settlement provides that a black commissioner shall be appointed rather than that black voters
would elect someone of their own choosing. However, the provision requiring
the appointment of three commissioners, including a black commissioner, is a
temporary measure, which will last only until 1992 when single-member districts
can be created. The court is of the opinion that this requirement is fair under
the special circumstances presented.
Id. at 824.
167. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,401 (1991). The Court explained:
Louisiana could, of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting
Rights Act by changing to a system in which judges are appointed, and, in that
way, it could enable its judges to be indifferent to popular opinion. The reasons
why Louisiana has chosen otherwise are precisely the reasons why it is appropriate for § 2, as well as § 5, of the Voting Rights Act to continue to apply to its
judicial elections.
Id.
My argument here is limited to judges, but perhaps it could be extended to other positions that are sometimes subject to election and sometimes to appointment. For
example, it could be applied to state attorneys general, who, like judges, sometimes are
expected to act independently rather than to be accountable to the public. But it would
not apply to legislators, for whom periodic accountability is considered a necessity.
168. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.24
(11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 704 (1996). McDuff argues that "a federal court
hearing a judicial elections case has no power itself to impose merit selection or some
other form of judicial appointment as a remedy" because "the court is required to adhere
to state policy as much as possible while still curing the violation," and many state laws
require competitive elections. McDuff, supra note 124, at 978. This comment, though
correct, does not consider whether judicial appointment could be used as a remedy when
a state changes its law to allow it.
Though skeptical of the argument, Wright notes that dicta in the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisom, 501 U.S. at 401, could be interpreted to allow a jurisdiction to move
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tion, two courts have held that a court may not approve a hybrid appointment/election plan in which the governor appoints a judge from
a list of persons nominated by a commission, with those nominated
later running in retention elections.'69
In Brooks v. State Board of Elections,' a federal district court
rejected the proposed settlement of a vote dilution challenge to
Georgia's system of electing judges that would have imposed an appointment plan featuring numerical goals for appointment of
African-American judges.
The court held that the plan violated
Georgia law in a number of ways," and that the numerical quota in
the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
Similarly, in White v. AlabamaY4 the Eleventh Circuit rejected a
proposed settlement remedy to counter vote dilution caused by Alabama's at-large system for electing appellate judges. Under the
from judicial elections to a pure appointive scheme similar to those used for selecting
federal judges. See Wright, supranote 136, at 689; see also id. at 689-90 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 97-227, at 18 (1981), stating that "shifts from elective to appointive office" may violate section 2).
169. Retention elections are subject to section 2, see, e.g., Bradley v. Indiana State
Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694, 696-98 (S.D. Ind. 1992), but the initial nomination and
appointment processes to choose those judges later to stand for retention election are not.
See Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446, 1453-55 (S.D. Ind. 1996); see also Williams v.
State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp. 1563, 1568-69 (N.D. 111. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs
cannot challenge system of appointive judges under section 2). But cf. Irby v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1357 (4th Cir. 1989) (refusing to decide whether
Virginia's choice of an appointive system over an elective scheme for selecting school
board members was subject to section 2).
170. 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1994), appeal dismissed, 59 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir.
1995).
171. See id. at 1551. Under the proposed settlement:
(1) the Governor will hereafter appoint all judges in Georgia; (2) appointed
judges will thereafter be subject only to retention elections; (3) by the end of
1994 there will be at least twenty-five black superior court judges and five additional blacks will be appointed to either the state court or the superior court; (4)
in order to realize these numerical requirements, a new category of judgeships,
"State Assignment Superior Court Judgeships" may be created and filled by
black candidates to serve by assignment in any of the State's judicial circuits; and
(5) any disputes that arise under this system in the future will be overseen by [a
senior federal district court judge].
Id.
172. See id. at 1564-69.
173. See id. at 1569-77. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the parties' joint appeal as
moot in 1995, because the governor had failed to appoint the requisite number of AfricanAmerican judges by the end of 1994, and therefore he had not satisfied the proposed settlement's third condition. See Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 59 F.3d 1114,
1118 (11th Cir. 1995).
174. 74F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 1996).
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settlement, Alabama would have created new appellate judgeships to
be appointed by a commission composed in part of members of the
plaintiff class. The number of additional judgeships to be created depended on the number of African-Americans elected to the court
through Alabama's usual election process. Appointed judges would
stand in a retention election after six years. 5 In rejecting the settlement that had been approved by the district court, the court of
appeals held:
A judicial remedy fashioned under section 2 must ...
enhance the ability of the plaintiffs to elect their candidates
of choice. Any remedy that has the effect of eliminating this
essential element of choice is invalid, for it contravenes the
spirit and purpose of the [Voting Rights] Act. A remedy
such as the one fashioned in this case, calling for the appointment of judges to posts which, under state law, are to
be filled by election, effectively nullifies voting power and
contravenes the stated objectives of section 2.
In short, the district court has employed the Voting
Rights Act to usurp voting power from the very minority
which, under the Act, is entitled to wield it. Such a practice
can hardly be condoned. We have repeatedly insisted that
the Act guarantees the right to elect representatives. The
will of the people is expressed through elections, not by
commissions created to divine their preferences for them.
We "find[] a certain irony in using the Voting Rights Act to
deny citizens the right to select public officials of their
choice."176
Commentators similarly have expressed skepticism about using
appointment to remedy vote dilution in judicial elections." Presag175. For details of the plan, see the district court opinion, White v. Alabama, 867 F.
Supp. 1519, 1531-33 (M.D. Ala. 1994), vacated and remanded, 74 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir.

1996).
176. White, 74 F.3d at 1069-70 (citations and footnotes omitted). The court also held
that the proposed settlement was impermissible because the district court "lacked the
authority to require Alabama to increase the size of its appellate courts," id. at 1072, and
it rejected the argument that the settlement should be approved because it constituted a
"consent decree" rather than a final judgment. See id. at 1073. The court did not reach
the question whether the proposed remedy would violate the Equal Protection Clause by
setting aside race-based seats on Alabama's appellate courts. See id. at 1071 n.42. The
court distinguished more typical Missouri plans, intimating that such plans might be ac-

ceptable remedies for a section 2 violation. See id. at 1070-71.
177. See, e.g., Prehoditch, supra note 165, at 559 ("[S]ome evidence exists that
[judicial] appointment does not remedy the problem the Voting Rights Act was designed
to address."); Fremstad, supra note 165, at 128 (suggesting that "the change to an ap-

pointive system may not pass muster under Sectionf. 2"); Izatt, supra note 136, at 260
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ing the language of the White opinion, attorney Robert McDuff
stated in 1993 that "there is something rather sinister about removing
the power to vote for judges at the very time litigation under the
Voting Rights Act promises that minority citizens will finally have
their fair share of that power."1' 78 Speaking more directly to the statutory language, McDuff argued that appointive systems would not
satisfy "the key objective of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which
is to increase the opportunity of minority voters to elect candidates of
their choice, not the choice of a Governor., 179 McDuff suggested that
a jurisdiction in which vote dilution has occurred may move to judicial appointment only "[y]ears later, after a fair election system has
been instituted and a state's judiciary is well integrated." '
Frederick Slabach, in contrast, does not believe a move to judicial appointment would be per se invalid; instead, he argues that if
plaintiffs can show under the totality of circumstances that
"minorities do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice, the shift
from elected to appointed judges would violate the substantive provisions of section 2. '1 Appointment would be permissible "only if
minority voters have the same opportunity to elect the appointing
authority that they had under the election scheme."'"
Though most judicial and scholarly authorities suggest that a
(noting that "a change to an appointment system may not be a realistic option for
states"); see also Chapman, supra note 165, at 476 ("[B]ecause of this potential for a lack
of minority representation, merit-selection plans which include a retention election would
be subject to suits under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.").
178. McDuff, supra note 124, at 978.
179. Id. at 979. "
180. Id. at 981.
181. Slabach, supra note 124, at 876.
182. Id. at 877. Brenda Wright points out the credibility problem of such a change:

If an election system is eliminated in favor of an appointive system in response
to litigation under Section 2, a jurisdiction will face the difficult task of explain-

ing why such a change was made just at the moment when the election system
was about to be opened to meaningful participation by minority voters.

Wright, supra note 136, at 689.
Slabach apparently believes that any appointment scheme failing to utilize direct, district-based elections of the appointing authority would be impermissible:
A change to appointment by a state-wide elected official would dilute minority
voting strength if multiple judicial offices are filled by election from majority
black districts. For example, if a majority white state elects twenty district court
judges from majority black districts and eighty from majority white districts, a
change to gubernatorial appointment would dilute minority voting strength because blacks do not constitute a majority of the vote in the gubernatorial
election.
Slabach, supra note 124, at 880.
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move to a lifetime appointment system would be impermissible as a
section 2 remedy, this is not a foregone conclusion. Importantly,
none of the cases discussed above involved a state that had amended
its law during litigation to allow for judicial appointment. As noted
above, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a state's interest in its judicial selection mechanisms should be considered at the remedy stage
of a section 2 case." Once a state articulates an interest in promoting
judicial independence, even during litigation, it should be entitled to
some weight, provided that the state can prove the proposed change
in the judicial selection mechanism actually furthers the permissible
state goal of judicial independence, as a move to lifetime appointment would do in this case.
In addition, the Brooks and White cases were complicated by
proposed appointment systems including possibly unconstitutional
racial quotas or targets. 18' A move to lifetime appointment eliminating these features would remove the possible constitutional
problems, though it could make it more difficult for a state to show
that the appointment plan will remedy minority vote dilution.
More fundamentally, the language of section 2 does not guarantee anyone a right to elect representatives, even though courts and
commentators suggest otherwise." Instead, it applies only when the
"political processes leading to nomination or election.., are not
equally open" to protected minority groups "in that [their] members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.""' One may fashion a strong textual argument that section 2
requires comparing minority voting power with majority voting
power. A move to lifetime judicial appointment would not violate
section 2 so read, because minority voting power would not be comparatively diminished.
If this interpretation is correct, a state's move to lifetime judicial
183. See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994) (en bane), cer denied,

115 S.Ct. 1795 (1995).
184. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,491 (1989) (plurality opinion).
185. As Slabach argues:
The state may argue that a shift from an elected judiciary to an appointed one
would provide minorities an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice
equal to that of the majority-that is, no opportunity to elect. Such an argument
misses the mark. Under a vote-dilution analysis, the fact that the state dilutes
the votes of the minority is not negated by the fact that it dilutes the votes of the

majority at the same time.
Slabach, supra note 124, at 876 n.324.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
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appointment would not violate section 2, and therefore such a move
should be a permissible remedy for a section 2 violation. Of course,
if the state wishes to move to lifetime judicial appointment with an
intention to discriminate against minority voters, the conduct would
still be open to a constitutional equal protection challenge.
Should courts and commentators continue to view a move to
lifetime judicial appointment as an impermissible remedy for a section 2 violation, Congress should amend section 2 to allow such a
move, particularly because, as shown in the next subpart, minorities
appear to fare as well under judicial appointment systems as under
elective systems.
3. Section 5 Preclearance May Be Denied for a Covered
Jurisdiction's Move to Lifetime Judicial Appointments
Section 4 of the VRA" lists certain "covered" jurisdictions that
have had a history of discrimination against particular minority voters.' Under section 5, these covered jurisdictions cannot enforce any
new "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" unless they either obtain
administrative preclearance from the Attorney General of the United
States" or a declaratory judgment from a three-judge court of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring
that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote" on account of race,
187. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4,42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994).
188. See id. As the court in Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1995), recently
explained:
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting. The heart of the Act is a complex scheme of stringent remedies
aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been the most flagrant. Section
5 of the Act imposes strict oversight on those states and jurisdictions that as recently as 1964 used the most overtly discriminatory tests and devices to prevent
minorities from fully participating in the electoral process. By freezing election
procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory, Congress intended to ensure that gains in minority political
participation were not eroded through the establishment of new discriminatory
procedures and techniques. Under section 5, it is the state or political subdivision thereof that bears the burden of proving that its change did not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.
Id. at 320 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). If the Attorney General fails to object within 60
days after submission of the change, the state may enforce the change. See id. If the Attorney General objects, the state may seek preclearance from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in a de novo proceeding. See id.
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color, or membership in a language minority group.9
Just a few weeks before the Supreme Court held in Chisom v.
Roemer 91 that section 2 applied to judicial elections, the Court in
Clark v. Roemer92 made clear that section 5 also applied to such elections. 93 Moreover, in Bunton v. Patterson,"'among the first section 5
cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Court held that a covered
jurisdiction's change from an election of a government official to appointment must be precleared under section 5.19' Thus, the courts
have made clear that a covered jurisdiction wishing to change from
judicial elections to lifetime judicial appointments must obtain preclearance from the Attorney General or the three-judge court; the
open question is whether preclearance should be granted for such a
change.
Neither the District Court for the District of Columbia nor the
Supreme Court has yet decided whether a covered jurisdiction's requested change to a judicial appointment system should be
precleared on grounds that it has neither a discriminatory purpose
190. See id. The Attorney General must apply the same standard in making that determination. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(a) (1996). In addition, 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2)
provides that the Attorney General should withhold preclearance under section 5 if the
change would violate the amended section 2, but two three-judge panels for the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia have held that this regulation interpreting section 5 preclearance standards misreads section 5. See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.
v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434, 443-44 (D.D.C. 1995); Georgia v. Reno, 881 F. Supp. 7, 14
(D.D.C. 1995), affd sub nom. Brooks v. Georgia, 116 S. Ct. 663 (1995) (mem.). The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Bossier to consider the issue. See 116 S. Ct.
1874 (1996).
191. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
192. 500 U.S. 646 (1991).
193. See id. at 653 ("The District Court maintained that the applicability of § 5 to
judges was uncertain until our summary affirmance in Brooks v. Georgia State Board of
Elections. But in Haith v. Martin [477 U.S. 901 (1986)], we issued a summary affirmance
of a decision holding that § 5 applied to judges." (citations omitted)). For a more detailed history of application of section 5 to judicial elections before Clark, see Slabach,
supra note 124, at 830-33.
194. Bunton was a companion case to Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969); see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,503 (1992) (reaffirming
that section 5 applies to changes "affecting the creation or abolition of an elective office").
195. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 569-70. The Court noted:
In [Bunton] an important county officer in certain counties was made appointive
instead of elective. The power of a citizen's vote is affected by this amendment;
after the change, he is prohibited from electing an officer formerly subject to the
approval of the voters. Such a change could be made either with or without a
discriminatory purpose or effect; however, the purpose of § 5 was to submit such
changes to scrutiny.
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nor effect.'96 Determining whether a discriminatory purpose exists
"'demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available.' " "Itimplies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group."'93 Whether a change to lifetime judicial
appointment would violate the purpose prong necessarily depends
upon the motive behind the change.' 9 A covered jurisdiction that
proposes a change to judicial appointment in order to prevent minorities from choosing their preferred judicial candidates would
violate the discriminatory purpose prong of section 5 as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment..2 m
But what of covered jurisdictions that wish to move to lifetime
judicial appointment in the absence of a discriminatory purpose?
196. Some may read dicta in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 (1991), as suggesting preclearance is not necessary for a change to judicial appointment. See supra note 168
and accompanying text (referencing dicta and discussing analogous argument regarding
effect of dicta on section 2). However, commentators agree that this reading of Chisom is
incorrect. See McDuff, supra note 124, at 980; Wright, supra note 136, at 689.
Three-judge district courts anywhere in the United States have jurisdiction to consider whether a state has made an electoral change without receiving preclearance in
violation of section 5 and to grant appropriate interim relief. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 55760. In Brooks v. State Bd of Elections, 838 F. Supp. 601, 608 (S.D. Ga. 1993), the court
refused to allow use of judicial appointments as an interim remedy pending approval of a
settlement plan. (As noted above, see supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text, the
Eleventh Circuit considering the section 2 portion of this case later refused to approve
this settlement.) The Supreme Court recently held that a three-judge district court convened to determine whether preclearance of judicial elections is required may not order a
state to conduct judicial elections as an interim remedy under the election plan that has
not yet been precleared. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 340,348 (1996).
197. Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318, 322 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal dismissed, 116 S.
Ct. 1037 (1996) (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,266 (1977)). Such evidence includes, but is not limited to:
any disparate impact the state's action has on protected minority groups; the historical background of the challenged decision; the specific sequence of events
leading up to that decision; any legislative or administrative history; any departure from the normal procedural sequence; and any evidence that the
decisionmaker ignored factors it has considered important or controlling when
making similar decisions in the past.
Id.
198. New York v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 394, 399 (D.D.C. 1994) (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979)).
199. In New York v. United States, the court rejected the argument that section 2's
requirements must be read into the discriminatory purpose prong of the section 5 test.
See id. at 398-400; see also infra note 202 (noting that courts rejected a similar argument
regarding the discriminatory effect prong).
200. See supra note 122 (noting intent standard for proving constitutional vote dilution).
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Such jurisdictions still must prove an absence of a discriminatory
"effect." The Supreme Court has stated that a voting procedure
change has a discriminatory effect when it "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise."' ' "If the position of minority
voters is no worse under the new scheme than it was under the old
scheme, then the proposed change is entitled to preclearance under
section 5." = Three decades of Supreme Court authority indicate that
discriminatory effect is measured solely in terms of "the effective exercise of the electoral franchise." 3 As Justice O'Connor observed
recently in Bush v. Vera: "Nonretrogression ... mandates that the
minority's opportunity to elect representatives of its choice
not be
''
diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions.
A three-judge panel from the District of Columbia recently explained how to determine whether a move from an elective to
appointive system violates the effects prong of section 5. In Texas v.
United States,.2 the court held that the effects prong of section 5 requires comparing the power of minority voters to choose candidates
under the electoral system with the power of minority voters to
choose the appointing authorities under the appointment system, and
finding retrogression when minority voting power so measured decreases.
This analysis suggests that a move from district-based
judicial elections to gubernatorial appointment (where the governor
is elected at-large) could be found to be retrogressive under section 5
201. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976). Recently, the Justice Department argued that "even a non-retrogressive change cannot be approved under section 5 if
that change violates the results test of section 2 of the Act." Arizona v. Reno, 887 F.
Supp. at 320-321; see also Slabach, supra note 124, at 874 (same); supra note 190
(discussing challenge to Justice Department regulation making same argument). However, all three-judge district courts for the District of Columbia considering the issue
uniformly have rejected the argument. See, e.g., Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F.

Supp. 434,443-44 (D.D.C. 1995) (rejecting the Justice Department's argument and citing
two other courts also rejecting it). The Supreme Court is considering Bossier this term.
See 116 S. Ct. 1874 (1996).

202. New York v. United States, 874 F. Supp. at 397; see also id. at 401 ("[T]here is
absolutely no requirement that proposed changes to voting laws place minority voters in a
betterposition relative to the existing system.").
203. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,2483 (1995); accord City of Lockhart v. United

States, 460 U.S. 125,134 (1983); Beer, 425 U.S. at 141:
204. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1950 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. 866 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1994).

206. See id. at 27-28; see also County Council of Sumter County S.C. v. United States,
555 F. Supp. 694,705 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that a move from an appointive system to an
elective one may be retrogressive, depending on the results minorities would achieve

under each system).
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in jurisdictions with existing majority-minority districts used to select
judges. For this reason, the Attorney General or court likely would
find a discriminatory effect under any lifetime judicial appointment
plan in which minorities do not have the same voting strength over
the appointive body that they had over the prior judicial elections.
However, retrogression arguably is a poor test to apply to determine discriminatory effect in cases involving a move from an
elective to an appointive system because retrogression does not
measure well whether minority members are really "no worse" under
the new appointive scheme. Instead, we might ask the broader, nonmechanical question whether a move to an appointive system truly
has a discriminatory effect on minority voters. This broader test
would not mandate striking down all appointive plans that use gubernatorial or other appointment systems using smaller appointive
bodies. Instead, it would allow the court to consider the position of
minorities before and after a move to appointment by looking at the
whole picture. If this test is applied, many moves to a lifetime judicial appointment system could be precleared.2
Empirical evidence demonstrates that, generally speaking, a system of lifetime judicial appointments would not hurt minority
interests. Consider first the number of minority judges chosen under
both elective and appointive systems. A 1993 study conducted by the
American Judicature Society found that 58% of African-American
appellate judges initially were selected by appointment,2 8 while only
26% were chosen through popular election." Interestingly, AfricanAmerican appellate judges were able to obtain the most relative success through the Missouri plan, despite the overwhelming lack of
minority representation on judicial nominating commissions."' The
207. Here, I imagine life tenure only for newly-selected judges. Current judges would
continue to serve out their term, and then would stand for consideration under the new
system awarding life tenure. Any automatic grandfathering-in of existing judges could, in
many jurisdictions, lock in existing racial and ethnic disparities in the judiciary.
208. See American Judicature Soc'y, African-American Judges Currently Serving on
State Courts of Last Resort and Intermediate Appellate Courts 1 (Jan. 1993)
(unpublished study on file with the author). Of those African-American appellate judges,
32% of the total were chosen through the Missouri plan, 20% of the total through gubernatorial appointment, and 6% through legislative appointment. See id.
209. See id. Of those, 11% of the total were chosen through partisan elections and
15% of the total through nonpartisan elections. See id. The remainder of AfricanAmerican appellate judges were chosen by some other mechanism, like court appointment to fill a vacancy. See id. at 2 n.2.
210. See Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 66-68. Goldschmidt notes that the American
Judicature Society has amended its model provisions to require consideration of diversity
issues in the formation of appointment commissions, and some states even have laws re-
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most comprehensive study of the racial composition of the judiciary,
conducted in 1985, concluded that "[a] higher percentage of women
and minorities achieved judicial office through an appointment process, either Executive Appointment (17.9%) or Merit Selection
(17.1%), than an elective process, whether Judicial Election (11.7%),
Partisan Election (11.2%), Nonpartisan Election (9.4%) or LegislaThe study also found that Africantive Election (6.9%).y,2
Americans made up 3.8% of state court judges (using both election
and appointment systems) and 7% of the federal judiciary (which relies solely on life-tenured appointment).2 1 Hispanics made up 1.2%
quiring a specified number of minority members on the commissions. See id. at 68 (citing
AJS Model Provisionsand various state laws). Criticism of the Missouri plan as preventing ethnic politics dates back to at least 1948, when Judge James Garrett Wallace wrote a
song entitled "The Old Missouri Plan," whose second stanza reads:
Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
Oh, the Old Missouri Plan,
It won't be served with sauerkrautnor sauce Italian.
There'll be no corned beef and cabbage,
And spaghettithey will ban;
There'll be no such dish
As gefilte fish
On the Old MissouriPlan.
FUND

FOR

MODERN

COURTS, THE SUCCESS

OF

WOMEN

AND MINORITIES

IN

ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS 66 (1985) (reprinting entire
song).
211. FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 210, at 65. The percentage attributable
to legislative election (6.9%) is particularly disheartening, especially considering that two
of the four states using legislative election, South Carolina and Virginia, have substantial
African-American populations. The 1985 study reveals that the commitment of the executive branch to minority judicial appointments is an important factor in determining the
number of such appointments. The data suggest that executives should have input in the
appointment process, or that supermajority requirements might be necessary to encourage log-rolling. They also suggest that courts should not allow a move to judicial
appointments by those states with a poor history of appointing minorities to other appointive positions. I discuss these points below.
Though the data discuss gender as well, I focus here only on the position of minority
judicial candidates and not the position of women judicial candidates. No doubt, women
have been underrepresented in the judiciary under all of the judicial selection mechanisms. See Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the Missouri Plan,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 949 (1986) (noting that women fare poorly under the Missouri
plan). Conducting a study of African-American, Hispanic, and female representation in
state judiciaries, Alozie concluded that the problems facing women in attaining judgeships
differ from the problems of racial and ethnic minorities and should be considered a different field of study. See Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distributionof Women and Minority Judges:
The Effects of JudicialSelection Methods, 71 SOC. SCI. Q. 315, 324 (1990). More directly
for the scope of this article, women cannot bring suit under the VRA because they are not
members of a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (extending protection only
to those discriminated against on the basis of race, color, or membership in a designated
language minority group).
212. See FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 210, at 13.

1360

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

of state court judges and 3.1% of the federal judiciary.21 At that
time, African-Americans constituted 11.7% of the U.S. population 14
and (in 1980) 2.7% of the attorneys in the U.S."' Hispanics constituted 6.4%27 of the U.S. population1 6 and (in 1980) 1.8% of the
attorneys.
These data do not necessarily indicate that judicial appointment
leads to a greaternumber of minority judges than is attained through
judicial elections. Using a multivariate statistical analysis of the data
from the same 1985 study, Professor Nicholas 0. Alozie concluded
that judicial selection systems did not significantly contribute to explaining the percentage of African-American judges.218 Judicial
selection systems were not a good predictor of the number of African-American judges; instead, the best predictor of the number of
African-American judges in a state was the percentage of AfricanAmerican lawyers in the state.219 Alozie also found a strong correlation of the proportion of Hispanic lawyers in the state with the
number of Hispanic judgeships."'
Alozie determined that African-Americans fare about equally
well under election and appointment methods. However, he also
found that "the higher the Hispanic share of votes [in judicial elections], the more likely Hispanics are to be represented on the
judiciary in partisan election jurisdictions."' 1 Alozie concluded that
213. See id.

214. See id. at 10.
215. See id. at 11.

216. See id. at 10.
217. See id. at 11.
218. See Nicholas 0. Alozie, Black Representation on State Judiciaries,69 SOc. SCI. Q.
979, 984 (1988).
219. See id. at 985.
220. See Alozie, supra note 211, at 318.
221. Id. at 323. Alozie goes on to explain why this effect may exist with Hispanics but

not African-Americans:
It is conceivable that this variation in the effects of black and Hispanic voters

stems from name identification. Champagne (1986) suggested that, absent all
other information about specific judicial candidates, the uninformed voter in a
voting booth leans toward party affiliation and the ethnicity of the candidate,

which is suggested by the candidate's name. Ethnic voters, on the average, can
recognize Hispanic names on election ballots (e.g., Raul Gonzalez for the Texas

Supreme Court). There is no way of knowing if other candidates are black or
white. For blacks wishing to vote along ethnic lines, then, prior knowledge of
the ethnicity of candidates on the ballot becomes fundamental.

Id. This explanation may not be correct, however. A recent study demonstrates not only
that Hispanic voters were best able to identify the ethnicity of Hispanic judicial candidates, but also that African-American voters were best able to identify the ethnicity of

African-American judicial candidates. See Champagne & Thielemann, supra note 41, at
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this difference could lead Hispanics to advocate partisan judicial elections and African-Americans to oppose such elections.m Although
he recognized that each group could "rationally choose to pursue different policy alternatives in their attempts to increase their
representation on state judiciaries," Alozie concluded that in the final
analysis, judicial selection systems did not influence significantly the
amount of minority representation on the bench.22 If forced to
choose one priority, Alozie suggested, "the major goal for both
groups might well be to increase their respective shares of states'
lawyers.", 4
The data measuring whether judicial appointment leads to more
minority judges than election systems are subject to some important
caveats. First, the number of minority judges who could be elected
may be understated in some studies. Many judicial elections have
been held in jurisdictions in which their minority votes have been diluted under the Gingles standard. A proper comparison would be the
rate of minorities appointed under appointive systems versus the
number of minorities elected from "undiluted" districts-but such
data are unavailable. Some people suspect that judicial elections
conducted using newly drawn subdistricts would lead to more minority judges than would be appointed under such a system.
On the other hand, the ability of minorities to get elected
through judicial elections may be overstated. Many minority judges
275.
Alozie also found that "whatever inducement the Hispanic vote may be on governors' willingness to appoint Hispanics to the judiciary, it does not seem to be a significant
factor in explaining interstate differentials in I-Ispanics' share of state judgeships."
Alozie, supra note 211, at 320.
222. See Alozie, supranote 211, at 323-24.

223. Id. at 324.
224. Id.
225. "Several studies indicated that at-large electoral systems account for the inequity
of black representation on governing bodies .... [BIlack representation is significantly
greater in cities with hybrid and district election systems ... ." Barbara Luck Graham,
Do JudicialSelection Systems Matter? A Study of Black Representationon State Courts,
18 AM. POL. Q. 316, 320 (1990); see also Luskin et al., supra note 47, at 319 (speculating

that single-member district judicial elections would increase minority representation).
The authors found that minority underrepresentation in merit plan jurisdictions is explained by the nomination process, not the retention process: 98.8% of white judges,
98.9% of black judges, and 95.7% of the Hispanic judges were retained. See id. at 320.
Illinois' recent experience with legislation creating new subdistricts (including two
majority-Hispanic districts) is expected to more than double the number of Hispanic
judges. For this reason, bar associations representing minorities in Illinois have opposed

moving to the Missouri plan for choosing judges. See David Bailey, Most JudicialPrimary
Winners PassedBar Muster, Complaints Aside, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 27, 1996, at 3,
11.
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in jurisdictions using judicial elections have come to the bench
through an interim appointment, and have been reelected because of
their incumbency status and in spite of their race.2 In fact, 40% of
all judges in states using partisan elections and 66% of judges in
states using nonpartisan elections were initially appointed. '7 Professor Barbara Graham suggests inher statistical analysis that when
taking both formal and informal judicial selection methods into account, appointment "increases black representation on the bench,
whereas election decreases it.' ' 2
A larger problem with the analysis above is that it assumes the
mere election of minority judges satisfies minority interests. Lani
Guinier has argued that electing African-Americans is important for
reflecting "the group consciousness, group history, and group perspective of a disadvantaged and stigmatized minority," but it is "a
limited empowerment tool." 9
After examining a number of assumptions upon which the theory of "Black Electoral Success" has been built, Guinier concludes
that "a system that gives everyone an equal chance of having their
political preferences physically representedis inadequate. A fair system of political representation would provide mechanisms to ensure
that disadvantaged and stigmatized minority groups also have a fair
chance to have their policy preferences satisfied.""
Perhaps, then, a better question to ask in considering whether
minorities are better off with an election versus an appointment system for choosing judges is whether judges chosen through lifetime
judicial appointment are more likely to support minority interests on

226. "[W]hile fifty-five percent of minority judgeships were listed as elective, seventyseven percent of African-American jurists surveyed were initially appointed to the bench,
often to fill a judicial vacancy." Goldschmidt, supra note 3, at 65 (citing MICHAEL D.
SMITH, RACE VERSUS ROBE: THE DILEMMA OF BLACK JUDGES 60 (1983)). For a study
of the election of former Florida Supreme Court Justice (and now Eleventh Circuit
Judge) Joseph Hackett, the first African-American since Reconstruction elected to a
statewide office in the South, see Burton Atkins et al., State Supreme Court Elections:
The Significance of Racial Cues, 12 AM. POL. Q.211, 211 (1984). The authors attribute
Hackett's electoral success to his incumbency status gained through initial appointment to
the bench, and note that he faced a marginal loss of support in white precincts because of
his race. See id. at 221.
227. See Scheuerman, supra note 28, at 476 (citing JEROME R. CORSI, JUDICIAL
POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 110 (1984)).
228. Graham, supra note 225, at 331. Graham notes that the "depression effect of
elections on black judicial recruitment might be explained by at-large judicial districts."
Id.
229. GUIN]ER, supra note 118, at 58.
230. Id. at 70.
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the bench than those standing for election. Certainly lifetime appointed federal judges have done much more than state judges (the
vast majority of whom stand for some kind of reelection or reappointmente') in protecting minority rights. After all, lifetime federal
judges are the ones who have enforced the VRA, school desegregation orders, and the like. 2 However, too many differences exist
between federal life-tenured judges and state judges to conclude
summarily that life tenure itself promotes greater concern for minorities.
I do not think firm conclusions can be drawn suggesting that a
move to life tenure coupled with appointment inevitably will be better for minority interests. But public choice theory may suggest a
reason life-tenured judges may now tend to support minority interests. As Part I explained, lifetime judges have every incentive to vote
their values. Attitudes toward minorities have changed dramatically
in the last few decades;' many new non-minority judges will be more
sympathetic to minority interests. Not all appointed judges will be
sympathetic, however, and evidence demonstrates that "whites and
blacks [still] differ considerably in their views regarding the appropriate measures for achieving equality and integration. ' -"
For this reason, promoting minority interests requires that minorities get appointed to the bench in increasing numbers. To the
extent that minorities tend to have similar values on average stemming from their communities of interest"5 (putting aside the
occasional Clarence Thomas 6 ), the analysis suggests that the ap231. See supra note 91 (listing only three states, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire, in which judges have life tenure or something close to it).
232. A noted law professor and civil rights litigator expressed his preference for litigating in federal court, in part because federal judges "are as insulated from majoritarian
pressures as is functionally possible," while state trial judges "on the other hand, generally [are] elected for a fixed term, rendering them vulnerable to majoritarian pressure."
Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV.1105, 1127-28 (1977). Neuborne
reconsiders his position in Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a JudicialForum
of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1995).
233. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperationand Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Productionand Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1056 (1995) (citing
social science literature demonstrating changing attitudes).

234. Id. at 1056-57; see also id. at 1057 n.216 (citing social science literature showing
these attitudes).
235. For a critical look at the assumption that "[b]lack elected officials will intuitively
understand the positions favored by their black constituents," see GUINIER, supra note

118, at 67, 66-69.
236. "Uncle Tom. Lawn jockey. Traitor. Sellout. Handkerchief-head. Those are just
a few of the terms black folks have used to describe Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas." Gregory Kane, Thomas Foes Silent About Marshall,BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 15,
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pointment of more minority judges will lead to more judges who vote
minority values. Although Guinier's concerns for the lack of power
of minority legislators' in a white-dominated legislature is wellgrounded in some states, this concern applies less to judges because
trial judges decide the outcome of most cases alone, and are infrequently reversed by appellate courts.
Furthermore, because
appellate court judges sit in collegial panels of three judges or more,
minority appellate judges on average have a greater say in collective
decisionmaking than minority legislators.
Given that the appointment of minority judges does matter, and
given that even some non-minority judges may vote their values consonant with minority interests, the final question is whether rational
vote-maximizing governors or legislators will appoint judges who
support minority interests. Certainly not all will. But to the extent
the VRA redistributes political power in the legislative branch to ensure undiluted minority voting strength, and to the extent the
legislative branch has formal or informal input into the appointment
process, pressure to appoint some minority candidates should exist.
One has difficulty imagining any state granting the governor sole
power over lifetime appointment of judges;" therefore, governors
and legislators likely will make decisions on life-tenured judicial candidates together.
As the VRA continues to improve the
representative quality of legislatures, we can expect more minority
judges and judges whose values align with minority interests to be
chosen for positions with life tenure.
To be sure, not all legislators will be inclined to appoint or approve judicial candidates likely to vote their values consistent with
minority preferences. Indeed, one might ask why minorities would
be expected to have greater influence over legislators choosing candidates for lifetime judicial appointment than they have had in
influencing legislators to change from a system of judicial elections
that has resulted in minority vote dilution. The answer, I believe, lies
in the force of inertia. Legislators may be reluctant to alter a judicial
1996, at lB. In a 1994 poll of African-Americans, 40% said they thought Thomas represented their views very well or somewhat well, compared to 44% who said he represented
their views little or not at all. See Overlooked, THE HoTLIN, Aug. 26, 1994, at 2. Other
African-American personalities or groups received the following "very well" or
"somewhat well" percentages: Jesse Jackson, 76%; NAACP, 71%; Black leaders in Congress, 61%; Colin Powell, 46%; Louis Farrakhan, 33%; Ben Chavis, 32%, "Gangsta"

rappers, 13%. See id.
237. See supra text accompanying note 230.
238. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting that no state gives the governor
alone to power to reappoint judges).
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selection mechanism, or any other structure of government that is
already in place, for reasons wholly unrelated to race. In contrast,
once legislators must choose life-tenured judges, they will be more
open to political pressure concerning who the judges should be and
the appropriate racial composition of the state judiciary.
One way of addressing a Guinier-like concern that majority
white legislatures will block minority judicial appointments is to impose supermajority voting requirements for the appointment of all
life-tenured judges. Such requirements will lead to increased logrolling, whereby white and minority legislators will trade votes for
judicial candidates to ensure the election of the candidates each
group of legislators prefers." A supermajority requirement also
seems sensible given the independence conferred upon a lifetime appointee.
In sum, if the discriminatory effects prong is read broadly, many
moves to lifetime judicial appointment should be precleared. However, if courts apply a mechanical retrogression test in this area, many
such changes could be barred. If courts or the Attorney General
block such moves under the retrogression test, Congress should
amend section 5 to give the Attorney General and courts the power
to approve a state's proposed move to lifetime judicial appointments
in appropriate circumstances. Among the factors a court should consider in determining whether to grant section 5 preclearance are:
& the extent to which the plan actually promotes judicial
independence. The state has a stronger argument that elections affect the independence of higher court judges
compared to trial court judges. A court should consider any
evidence the state can present that judges have not acted independently under the state's judicial selection system.
• whether the proposed method of initial appointment is
likely to lead to the appointment of minorities and minoritypreferred candidates to judgeships. Particularly important
is the question of how these candidates will fare compared
to how they fared under the former method of judicial elections. A court should consider whether the governor and
the legislature have appointed minorities and other minority-preferred candidates to other appointive offices in the
state.
239. On the other hand, log-rolling may occur without supermajority requirements,

and "supermajority rules might actually impede such a strategy by denying progressive
majorities the ability to overcome the resistance of a conservative, or even racist, minority." Pamela S. Karlan, Democracy and Dis-Appointment, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1287
(1995) (book review).
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* the state's motivation for advocating a change. A state
should be concerned about judicial independence. States
should not be permitted to make such a change for the purpose of discriminating against minority voters.'
Nothing in this proposed change to the VRA should weaken the
other important protections under the Act. 41 Moreover, nothing in
the proposed change would prevent states that wished to continue
electing their judges from doing so. They simply must conduct their
elections in compliance with the VRA. If complying with both the
VRA and the United States Constitution remains difficult, 42 however, a move to a judicial appointment system could become a
palatable choice for jurisdictions whose judicial election systems are
open to challenge under section 2.
CONCLUSION

A better understanding of how judicial selection mechanisms affect judicial decisionmaking is important to a number of areas in the
law. This Article examined how the public choice model of judging
illuminates the apparent clash between state interests in their judicial
selection mechanisms and the advancement of minority political representation under the Voting Rights Act. The model may help
answer other questions as well, such as whether judges should be protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act243 and whether
campaign contributions to judges should be limited or barred in particular circumstances.244 But these questions are for another day.
The model also refocuses the debate over judicial selection
mechanisms beyond the simple election-accountability/appointmentindependence dichotomy. The extent to which judges deviate from
judicial independence depends upon term length and the salience of
the judicial race. Though the model does not purport to resolve the
240. This conduct also runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra notes 124,200 and accompanying text.

241. Of course, an attempt to make any change in the VRA could have the unintended
consequence of opening up the legislation to additional changes, some of which could
endanger the important protections the Act provides. "'If I know anything about Congress,' Benjamin Hooks, [former] executive director of the NAACP, said in 1981, 'once
they start tinkering with something, we do not know how far it will go.' " THERNSTROM,
supra note 118, at 79.
242. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.

243. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (holding that judges are not
subject to the ADEA).

244. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (citing literature on campaign finance in
judicial elections).
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policy debate over independence versus accountability as the appropriate judicial model, it suggests methods by which reformers
favoring either policy may best achieve their ends.

